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Abstract
This paper will first examine some of the causes over many years and conditions
that evolved that preceded the 2007-2009 credit crisis as well as some of the events that
took place in the midst of the crisis. More importantly, this paper will examine how
central banks applied the generally prescribed first line defense in the form of
conventional monetary policy to its full extent without complete or adequate satisfaction
or result. The bulk of the paper is directed at a description and analysis of the
unconventional monetary tools, that which has come to be called quantitative easing, that
central banks may employ in instances where the demand for liquidity and the
accompanying panic essentially overrun the liquidity levels normally associated with
conventional monetary policy.
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Chapter One: Introduction to Credit Bubbles and Liquidity Traps
This paper will examine how central banks may apply monetary policy in
combating an economic crisis originating from the assumption of excessive leverage on
behalf of financial intermediaries* that explodes into crisis-level liquidity demand. First,
however, it will be important to discuss the nature of the financial services industry in
general. I will then proceed to discuss the credit crisis of 2007-2009 and its impact on the
financial industry and monetary policy.
The Nature of Financial Intermediaries and Debt versus Equity
In respect to the general nature of the financial industry, it is first important to
distinguish between the two types of capital that a financial intermediary will possess.
The first type of capital, that is debt, is comprised of customer deposits and for
accounting purposes is considered a liability of the financial intermediary as such capital
must be returned one day to the depositor. Debt capital for a financial intermediary
consists typically of demand deposits (such as checkable deposits and savings accounts),
time deposits (such as certificates of deposit), money market mutual funds, and insurance
contract cash values. Debt that represents deposits will certainly always be leveraged
very heavily, which is a key attribute of a financial intermediary. That is, the ability to
create 100 dollars in loans from 3 dollars in deposits for the banking system as a whole,
*

It should be noted that throughout this paper terms like “financial intermediaries,” “financial institutions,”
“banks,” etc. will be used interchangeably to collectively refer to firms and institutions within the financial
services industry.
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which obviously implies a 3% reserve requirement. The main reason why financial
institutions are unique in this respect is that by their very nature, the interest rate that they
will pay out on deposits will ordinarily rise and fall in close conjunction with the rate
they receive on loans and other such assets. Therefore, assuming the institution builds its
term structure adequately, there usually is not much of a problem in meeting liabilities
with maturing assets. In addition, the typically wide spread in the interest rate that such
institutions will pay out versus what they can collect certainly allows for a wide margin
of error if they fail to get their maturities lined up just right. Because of these unique
advantages and the need to inspire great confidence amongst depositors, the deposits of a
financial intermediary are typically government insured and heavily regulated.
Therefore, it is not likely this type of capital could be subjected to excessive leverage
without violating securities and banking regulations. Therefore, this paper will not be
concerned with this type of capital or the leverage associated with it.
The second type of capital that a financial intermediary will possess, that is equity,
consists of assets owned by the financial intermediary. The sources of such capital
might be retained earnings, shareholder equity, or subordinated and unsubordinated debt
of the financial intermediary. Equity is considered an asset of the financial intermediary.
Typically financial intermediaries do not require much in the way of equity to
operate. As such, it is common and perfectly acceptable for them to operate under fairly
heavy leverage to begin with. For instance, a financial intermediary might normally
operate under a 10:1 debt-to-equity ratio, implying fairly heavy debt. Within any other
industry, such a ratio would be viewed as excessive and certainly moving towards
insolvency. However, because most other industries will use debt to acquire capital
2

equipment (such as machinery or a factory) or land, leverage will only work to the extent
the return on the debt exceeds principal and interest payments, which typically limits debt
ratios in more traditional industries to around 2:1.
Because of the unique advantage described earlier of a financial intermediary,
leverage on deposits will represent one of the primary sources of revenues and
profitability in any financial institution. Again, that unique advantage is a financial
intermediary’s ability to coordinate the interest rate it pays on deposits (the banks
liabilities) with the interest rate they typically receive on loans and other bank assets,
which ordinarily rise and fall in conjunction with one another.
Additionally, the spread in the interest rate that banks pay out on deposits versus
what they typically charge on loans is typically wide enough to allow for minor to
moderate errors in aligning their term structure. However, as will be discussed in greater
detail, this unique advantage of financial intermediaries can also be abused. An
institution or possibly many institutions simultaneously, may find themselves over
leveraged simply due to mistakes in structuring their maturing loans such that capital
comes available as needed, or more likely in succumbing to a profit incentive to generate
higher profit levels from a relatively fixed equity base. In either case, the problem of
over leverage will become apparent when too much lending risk is pursued.
My point in drawing the distinction between these two very different forms of
leverage in a financial intermediary is so the reader will understand that leverage built on
deposits is not the concern of this paper and will not be reviewed in any capacity.
Leverage built on the back of a bank’s own equity is at the heart of this paper and the
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central theme in instances where a bank, or an entire industry, over-leverages its own
equity.
The Events and Chronology of the 2007-2009 Credit Bubble
The following general chronology outlines several instances where failing firms
were not allowed to fail as well as a legislative culture more conducive to inadequate
regulation. There is not anything particularly unique in my description or analysis of
these events. For example, Roger Thompson of the Harvard Business School presented a
similar explanation and sequence of events leading up to the credit bubble. (Thompson,
2009) However, and for the most part, these events are presented here from my own
recollection and interpretation except where footnoted.
The Long-Term Capital Management L.P. rescue of 1998.
Long Term Capital Management, L.P. (LTCM) was a very large and notable
hedge fund that began operations in 1994. By January 1, 1998, the fund had grown to
$4.8 billion in equity capital in only 4 years of operation. The firm was notable because
it was managed by highly respected financial industry and academic leaders. The firm
was organized and run by John Meriwether who had come out of the fixed income
culture at Salomon Brothers. In addition, LTCM counted several math and economics
PhD’s and two Nobel Prize winners in its brain trust. (Lowenstein, 2000, p. xix)
LTCM employed a highly refined arbitrage strategy that utilized sophisticated
computer models developed by its brain trust to exploit market inefficiencies under the
presumption that “over time, all markets tend to get more efficient.” (Lowenstein, 2000,
p. 12) Often the inefficiencies they pursued were so small that the only way to generate a
reasonable profit was to employ very heavy leverage. According to Lowenstein, from the
4

start LTCM had planned to leverage its capital twenty or thirty times. (Lowenstein, 2000,
p. 26) The fact that there were never any practical limitations placed on the firms
leverage obviously figured into the explanation as to how LTCM became so leveraged.
Apparently, the only limitation was provided by the firms’ principals, “From their
perspective, the desire to maximize returns (and management fees) on each dollar of
invested capital naturally created an incentive to increase leverage.” (Report of the
President's Working Group on Financial Markets, April, 1999, p. 16) In the four years of
its operation, LTCM regularly reported striking returns to its investors: 40% in 1995 and
1996, close to 20% in 1997. (Report of the President's Working Group on Financial
Markets, April, 1999, p. 11)
The danger with leverage is that the return on the leveraged assets might fall
below the cost of debt for a long enough period of time so as to completely erode away
the investor’s capital cushion, leaving them insolvent. Unable to meet the terms of the
various debt agreements with existing liquidity, the investor is left illiquid. That is, the
investor may have to declare bankruptcy as they have been stripped of everything except
maybe some otherwise illiquid assets.
For instance, an investor who owns a particular holding long and completely paid
for (that is, unleveraged) will have no sense of urgency as to when the investment might
appreciate. On the other hand, a leveraged investment will need to appreciate at a rate in
excess of the debt service costs, and before the terms of the leverage contract expire (in
the case of options-type contracts) or before they run out of capital (in the case of creditleveraged contracts). This can often create a frustrating paradox in that the investor
might be correct in his or her initial assessment of the investment and the underlying
5

assumptions, but may not survive long enough if the investment goes awry and the
investor has an inadequate capital cushion to meet the inevitable capital calls. In other
words, just because an inefficient price presents itself today, what’s to say it cannot
become more inefficient before reverting back to a largely theoretical “efficient” price?
LTCM’s problems began when several newly emerging countries began to
devalue their currency in the summer of 1998, most notably Thailand followed by Russia.
As the value of the debt tied to these devalued currencies dropped immediately and
precipitously, capital calls were generated of all who held these contracts. Even though
LTCM was not heavily exposed to the debt of these countries, they were heavily exposed
to other more liquid securities, specifically long term US Treasury bonds, that came
under heavy selling pressure as holders of the emerging country debt started selling
whatever they could to meet the capital calls.
By September of 1998, LTCM had leveraged its $4.8 billion in equity over 25
times into ownership of over $125 billion in assets. (Report of the President's Working
Group on Financial Markets, April, 1999, p. 12) Being heavily leveraged, it didn’t take
much devaluation of their bond holdings for LTCM to start generating capital calls of
their own. In order to raise capital, LTCM tried to unwind its own debt positions.
Obviously, trying to liquidate such large positions in an environment where bids were
already highly overwhelmed with even more selling only further depressed the market
price of the various debt instruments. This unfortunate reality is common when the
collateral that secures the leverage for an asset purchase is indeed the asset itself. A
death spiral (or concentrated liquidity trap of sorts) will ensue whereby in order to meet
the capital call generated by falling asset prices, more and more of that same asset is
6

forced to liquidation thereby further depressing the asset price and likely generating more
capital calls. (Morris & Shin, 2004, p. 2)
In addition, owing to the falling equity account at LTCM, credit arrangements that
had been made with LTCM became much more rigid with greater demands for more
collateral. Daily mark-to-market valuations by the counter-parties generated additional
capital calls further constraining liquidity. (Report of the President's Working Group on
Financial Markets, April, 1999, pp. 12-13) Essentially, as loose and free flowing as
credit and money had been to LTCM while they were favored by the market when prices
were inflating, credit and money became inversely constrained once the market suspected
problems at LTCM.
Had the collapse of LTCM been contained to LTCM and maybe a few smaller
firms, or possibly spread out amongst numerous firms such that no single firm would
have been jeopardized, it’s hard to imagine much concern at the Federal Reserve. After
all, it’s not likely that government regulators would normally really care about a few
dozen otherwise wealthy individuals victimized by their own greed. However, LTCM
was very integrated through its various creditors and counter-parties, which included over
60,000 trades booked through, among others, Goldman Sachs Group, LP; Salomon Smith
Barney; Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.; UBS AG; Chase Manhattan Corporation;
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.; and Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. As LTCM’s liquidity
evaporated, the Federal Reserve became very concerned that the sudden and massive
liquidation of LTCM’s positions “would have been disorderly and have adverse market
effects on many other market participants.” (Report of the President's Working Group on
Financial Markets, April, 1999, p. 16)
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On September 23, 1998, then New York Fed Chairman William McDonough
called an emergency meeting of LTCM and its primary trading counter-parties and
creditors. In order to prevent the possibility of market chaos and the potential spillover
effect to the broad economy, McDonough convinced a consortium of fourteen firms to
put up $3.6 billion in new equity in exchange for 90 % ownership of LTCM. The
original principals of LTCM were allowed to retain 10 % ownership. This quick action
did arrest the panic and LTCM was gradually allowed to wind down in an orderly and
quiet manner.
The LTCM case serves as an excellent microcosm of the workings and potential
problems of excessive leverage. As long as the leveraged positions continue to inflate
and remain liquid, tremendous gains can accumulate. Conversely, leveraged positions
can quickly generate massive capital calls once the positions begin to deflate. In
addition, a liquidity death spiral of sorts, very similar in nature if not in scope to a
liquidity trap, is illustrated. In the context of this paper, LTCM might be viewed as a
credit bubble that was contained to LTCM while the bubble was inflating and through the
efforts of the NYFRB to coordinate the various creditors and counter-parties involved,
was successfully absorbed and contained to LTCM and a few of its trading partners when
the bubble collapsed.
Long Term Capital Management L.P. – symptomatic of a financial system with
insufficient regard for risk assessment and moral hazard.
The two questions at hand in respect to LTCM’s contribution to the 2008 credit
bubble are: 1) did the NYFRB’s effort to rescue LTCM help to condition investors and
markets for more excessive risk and leverage and thereby contribute to the 2007-2009
8

credit bubble, and 2) did regulators fail to recognize the systemic risk that LTCM had
created as it continued to aggressively leverage its expanding capital base?
Two observations from Haubrich’s essay address the first question. (Haubrich,
April 2007, p. 4) The first observation is that the coordination effort of the NYFRB may
have produced a government sponsored (or at least brokered) arrangement that
effectively crowded out “a very credible and secure” private investor in Warren Buffett.
Buffet’s bid for LTCM would have left the original principals with no stake in the
reorganized firm, whereas the NYFRB brokered deal allowed the principals to retain a
10% stake. Certainly, in comparison to the wealth they had amassed in the LTCM
buildup, a 10% stake may seem adequately pecuniary. However, that the principals were
allowed to walk away with any capital at all would certainly have to be viewed as an
affront to the principal of moral hazard and the right to go bankrupt.
Further support that the LTCM rescue contributed to an attitude of more risk
taking and moral hazard comes from Papadimitriou and Wray in their description of “the
Greenspan put.” Among several components of the Greenspan put they describe is that
the LTCM rescue “tipped the balance of sentiments from fear toward greed”, they
describe “a belief that the Fed would not allow bad things to happen, with evidence
drawn from the arranged LTCM rescue.” (Papdimitriou, 2008, p. xxiv) Another
component of the Greenspan put were low interest rates in the wake of the dot.com bust
and the 9-11 terrorist attacks, which will be addressed shortly.
The second and more significant observation of Haubrich was a statement by then
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony; “As far as I’m concerned,
talking about institutions or such, I say nothing is too-big-to-fail. (However), there is an
9

issue here of too-big-to-liquidate-quickly.” (Haubrich, April 2007, p. 6) LTCM was
never liquidated; rather its assets were assumed by a consortium of much larger
institutions that were in a better position to hold the distressed assets until the markets
stabilized. Greenspan’s statement could certainly be interpreted as recognition that given
adequate capital and a favorable environment, there could be circumstances that would
justify calling on a larger institution to absorb a firm with problematic assets that rise to
the systemic level. Perhaps in circumstances where the underlying problem is
temporarily panicked markets characterized by overwhelming selling of otherwise sound
assets with intrinsic value, an institution such as the US Government might be justified in
bringing to bear its virtually unlimited balance sheet and liquidity until such time as
markets return to a more rational state.
The second question of whether regulators failed to accurately assess the systemic
risk that LTCM created seems fairly apparent. At the time, regulators were really only
concerned with investor protection from unscrupulous practices of financial
intermediaries, which is addressed in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and their various revisions. In fact, at the time, even the GlassStegall Act of 1933 was still in effect. In respect to the regulation of financial
intermediaries, Glass-Stegall was substantial in that it prevented financial firms from
operating outside their respective and fairly narrowly defined industries. For example,
commercial banks were prohibited from underwriting and selling insurance products or
from underwriting and selling investment securities. Similarly, investment banks were
prohibited from taking demand deposits and underwriting loans, and so on.
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The Glass-Stegall Act made the whole issue of too-big-to-fail a much more
remote possibility for two reasons. First, although firms could certainly grow and
consolidate their specific industry, they obviously could not expand beyond that industry
and consolidate additional functions. Essentially, firms were limited by the size of their
specific industry of commercial banking, investment banking, or insurance.
Secondly, by limiting firms to a single specific and defined industry, the GlassStegall Act made regulation considerably more manageable as regulators could more
easily focus on a single industry and the traits and nuances of that single industry. Prior
to the repeal of the Glass-Stegall Act, the SEC and the NASD (National Association of
Securities Dealers, an SRO) were very effective in regulating the investment banking
industry and securities dealers. State insurance commissions effectively regulated
insurance companies. State banking examiners and the Federal Reserve regulated the
commercial banking industry. Each regulatory authority had very clear responsibilities
and was reasonably familiar with their respective industry. In addition, there was no
confusion over jurisdiction. Prior to its repeal in 1999, the Glass-Stegall Act did help
prevent any single institution from rising to the level that they might pose a systemic risk.
So it is understandable that regulators were not overly concerned about the impact to the
economy or the financial system in general from the failure of any single institution.
In respect to hedge funds, which were open only to wealthy investors who were
presumably sophisticated enough to assess the risk they were assuming and could bear
such risk, these funds were largely unregulated at all. Nobody was really concerned
about the systemic risk that hedge funds might possess. However, the swiftness of the
NYFRB’s recognition of the problems at LTCM and its efforts to arrest the problems,
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which was largely outside of the institution’s normal scope of responsibility and
authority, is very admirable. It is hard to see how regulators failed in their stated
responsibilities in respect to LTCM. However, given the magnitude of what could have
happened without McDonough’s leadership, it is discouraging that Congress never acted
to at least regulate the systemic threat of hedge funds. In fact, only today - 11 years, 2
recessions, and a massive credit bubble later - is Congress finally contemplating the
regulation of hedge funds and the deeper problem of systemic risk endemic to the
financial industry.
Therefore, I would conclude that the failure of Congress to regulate the systemic
risk posed by hedge funds in the aftermath of LTCM did greatly contribute to a culture
that perhaps turned a blind eye to excessive leverage and greater moral hazard. In
addition, a possibly tacit acceptance of the to-big-to-liquidate-quickly principal did
contribute to a culture of greater leverage, higher returns and risk, and greater moral
hazard. All of which certainly contributed to the credit buildup that (hopefully) climaxed
in 2008.
That is certainly not to say or suggest that LTCM and the regulatory response or
lack thereof single-handedly created the sub-prime credit crisis. While the LTCM
episode and the regulatory response arguably contributed to the problem of irresponsible
debt levels and inadequate regulation, it seems it is more symptomatic of a culture that
has evolved in which risk will be rewarded, but failure is not if the institution is big
enough. After all, the Savings and Loan crisis of the late 1980’s was eerily similar in
many respects to the banking and international credit crisis of 2007-2009 and obviously
preceded even LTCM.
12

Deregulation of financial intermediaries and mortgage securitization.
The general regulatory environment in the US since the early 1980’s has been
towards a more relaxed environment across numerous industries; including airlines,
telecommunications, utilities, and certainly financial services. The generally accepted
theory being an attitude biased towards laissez-faire would lower production costs and
therefore allow for more competitive and innovative products at lower costs to
consumers. Where regulation was necessary to protect the consumer, as in the financial
services industry, it seems the government was swinging more to favor self-regulation
where possible and practical.
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994.
The first piece of legislation aimed at deregulating the financial services industry
in the run-up to the international credit crisis was the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Act of 1994. This act repealed the prohibition on interstate banking
established under the Bank Holding Act of 1956. In the wake of that act, commercial
banks began a frenzy of interstate mergers and acquisitions. Prior to passage of the Act,
commercial banks were consolidating at a fairly stable rate of 3.51% per year with
average total assets expanding by 6.74%. With passage of interstate banking,
commercial banks were able to consolidate more aggressively (4.36% average
consolidation from 1993-1998) and average total assets expanded at a rate of 12.51% (see
Appendix A).
With banking deregulation, new innovations were quickly introduced as well,
such as; branch banking, networked ATM’s, and the securitization (or pooling) of loans,
in particular mortgages. The Act was clearly successful at enabling commercial banks to
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expand across state lines, many times absorbing smaller and long entrenched institutions.
With this major expansion, truly mega-banking institutions began to emerge, including
Bank of America, Wells Fargo & Co., Citibank, and Chase Manhattan Corp. Too, as the
Act had intended, more competitive services were able to be delivered to more customers
in virtually every region of the country.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.
The second piece of legislation aimed at deregulation of the financial services
industry during this era was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), also known
as the Financial Modernization Act of 1999. The key sponsor of the bill Senator Gramm
stated the purpose of the legislation was “to expand both the volume and the quality of
financial services and produce lower prices for the American consumer.” (Gramm,
Opening Statement at August 3, 1999 Meeting of Conference on S. 900, 1999) By far,
the most sweeping reform of GLBA was the repeal of sections 20 and 32 of the GlassSteagall Act, which had prohibited commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance
companies from operating outside of their respective industry. The intent was to create
even more competition amongst financial institutions and more economies of large scale
to ultimately “provide lower prices and one-stop shopping at financial supermarkets in
every city and town in the country.” (Gramm, 1999) Perhaps the model for this new era
in the post-GLBA period can be seen in the mega-merger of Citibank, Travelers
Corporation, and Solomon Smith Barney in 1998 (actually prior to GLBA passage – but
that’s another story). Just as Riegle-Neal had allowed commercial banks to consolidate
across state lines, GLBA allowed even further consolidation across the various financial
industries.
14

It seems fairly safe to say that these two Acts did successfully and dramatically
expand banking services and banking innovation. Just as the “deregulation era” brought
new innovations to telecommunications, airlines, utilities, and other industries; the
financial services industry was no exception. Money market mutual funds, brokered
CD’s, bank branded credit cards, and securitized mortgages allowed investors to achieve
higher rates of return and more liquidity while at the same time creating vastly expanded
access to markets and greater diversification.
The financial innovation of securitization.
One innovation in particular that needs to further examination in the context of
the 2008–2009 credit crisis is the rise of securitized mortgages, and particularly
securitized pools of subprime loans. The traditional model for securing a home loan was
a fairly simple and bilateral contract. Typically, a borrower had to make a down payment
of 10 – 20% of the purchase price, which certainly served as a reasonable deterrent to
foreclosure if things got rough and also attractive collateral to the lender. Fixed rate
mortgages were by far the most common loan, so the borrower was conditioned each
month to the same payment. Finally, and probably most important, each loan was
typically underwritten locally by a loan officer who was intimately familiar with the risk
of the loan. After the loan was closed, the bank would typically sell the note to Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac, or perhaps a pool of private investors, thereby releasing the loan
from the bank’s capital requirements. In the event the loan was sold to Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac, which was the case with the vast majority of loans, it was transferred to the
virtually unlimited balance sheet of the quasi-government agencies. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac were happy to buy the loans because their costs of capital are legislatively
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held below market rates thereby assuring a higher return than what the bank could have
achieved, but also because they were reasonably secure that the loans had been
underwritten to Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s standards through a fairly exhaustive
procedure by personal bankers.
As banks grew into monoliths, that traditional model became more and more
inefficient and unworkable. First, the banks themselves in their expansion had either
acquired or crowded out virtually every small to mid size institution that had the personal
relationships with their depositors, who after all were ultimately the borrowers as well.
Second, in order to achieve the efficiencies necessary to drive down their loan origination
costs, the mega-banks had to adopt more streamlined and quantitative methods for
determining creditworthiness. This led to the expanded use of FICO scores and Loan to
Value (LTV) ratios as really the only considerations in the loan process. Once loans
could be “categorized” into pools of similar loans, investors could easily acquire a highly
diversified interest in a pool of loans that fit their personal risk criteria. These pools were
called things like Asset Backed Securities, Collateralized Debt Obligations, and
Mortgage Backed Securities.
At this point, it would seem that the deregulation process had worked out rather
well. More capital had been brought to bear from individual and institutional investors
through the securitization process, which had the effect of making more capital available
from both banks and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac and ultimately drove interest rates lower.
However, insofar as capitalism and innovation will always move ahead faster than
regulators can keep up, the great securitization wave was able to forge ahead largely
unregulated. In order to feed the voracious appetite for more loans created by the new
16

liquidity, both from the innovation of loan securitization but also from likely artificially
low interest rates (to be examined shortly), the financial services industry was able to
expand the securitization process very aggressively into progressively more risky loan
pools. Thus began the sub-prime craze in 2004-2006.
In their competitive fury, financial institutions began writing loans with more and
more reckless underwriting standards. Loans without any income verification became
common. Under the assumption that US real estate never lost value, 100% LTV loans
and 125% cash out refinance loans became common. Finally, the so-called “teaser-rate”
loans emerged. These loans clearly were intended only to get a loan written (and
generate a commission for the originator of the loan) without any consideration for the
borrower’s ability to make the payments. Frequently, the loan originator would keep
initial payments low by amortizing a part of the principal back into the loan each month,
thus creating a growing loan balance each month. As everyone (except the borrower)
knew, these loans would be immediately bundled up into a subprime pool and sold to
someone else. By the time the loans would begin to default, the loan originator and the
original lender would be long gone. As one can see, there was no risk to those
originating the loans. The risk was all passed on up the chain to an anonymous
investment pool. Nouriel Roubini referred to this process as the “Originate to Distribute
Model.” (Roubini, 2008) In fact, trading desks I worked with many years ago executing
principal transactions would caustically refer to this type of recklessness as the “Bigger
Sucker Theory.” You really didn’t care what price you paid for an asset as long as you
knew there was someone else willing to pay more. Thus is the nature of every bubble –
value becomes irrelevant.
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The downside of all of the massive consolidation and innovation is now fairly
obvious. First of all, as many firms consolidated into a few massive and concentrated
institutions, the systemic risk to the entire financial system expanded exponentially from
the potential failure of any single “mega-bank.” Second, regulators will always be at a
distinct disadvantage in keeping their regulatory authority both current and effective in a
period of rapid innovation and growing complexity. Finally, because asset securitization
could create and readily distribute massive amounts of loan liquidity, the ill-conceived
sub-prime wave was allowed to expand much faster than what anyone realized or could
have been expected reasonably to regulate.
Unusually low interest rates in a recovery from 2002–2006.
The US economy was in an expansion that had begun in the fourth quarter of
2001 following a relatively shallow but extended 15 month recession. The conventional
monetary prescription for dealing with an economic contraction through monetary easing
had worked in textbook fashion (see Illustration 1 below). During that recessionary
period, the Federal Reserve under Chairman Alan Greenspan aggressively cut the fed
funds target rate from 6.5% in June, 2000 to 1.0% by March, 2003 to create monetary
stimulus.
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GDP vs. Fed Funds Rate: 2000‐2009
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Figure 1 (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Q1 2000 - Q1 2009)
By the fourth quarter of 2001, real GDP had started to expand and by the first
quarter of 2002, it seemed on path for economic recovery as evidenced by two
consecutive quarters of positive annualized GDP, 1.56% and 2.72% respectively.
However, for reasons to be examined shortly, the Federal Reserve continued to hold the
fed funds target rate at an unusually low level relative to economic output. It was not
until the fourth quarter of 2004, nearly 3 years later, that the Federal Reserve commenced
an aggressive campaign to raise the fed funds target. For reference, the average lag from
the decided end of the prior six recessions (going back to 1956-57) until monetary
tightening resumed has been 3.7 quarters (see Figure 2).
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Recession Period

Lag to Monetary Tightening

1956-1957

1 quarter

1959-1960

3 quarters

1969-1971

1 quarter

1973-1975

4 quarters

1980-1982

2 quarters

1990-1991

11 quarters

2000-2001

11 quarters

Figure 2 (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1948 - 2001) (Federal Reserve Bank, 1948 2001)
The first question that needs to be addressed from this observation is a possible
explanation for why the Federal Reserve felt compelled to maintain such an
accommodative monetary policy for so long. The second and obviously more relevant
question would be to determine whether the Fed's accommodative policy during that
period contributed to the credit bubble in question.
Addressing the first question will necessarily require a good deal of speculation as
FOMC meetings are closed to the public. However, a review of the relevant FOMC
comments (March 19, 2002 – May 4, 2004) and accompanying minutes offer some
explanation. Throughout the period in question, the Federal Reserve displayed only a
token concern for price inflation with statements to the effect, “increases in core
consumer prices are muted and expected to remain low.” (Federal Reserve Bank, 20022004)
At the same time, however, energy prices were beginning to trend higher. West
Texas Intermediate Crude traded for $19.33/bbl at the end of 2001, $29.42/bbl at the end
of 2002, $32.15 at the end of 2003, and $43.33 by the end of 2004. Ordinarily, being a
component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), higher energy prices would be viewed as
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inflationary. Until recently, this appeared to be the view of the Federal Reserve as well
as their policy for combating higher energy prices as evidenced by the observation that
each oil shock back to 1971 was accompanied by higher fed funds rates. (Carlstrom,
April 2005, p. 2)
However, because energy is also a staple of every developed economy, perhaps
the Federal Reserve in 2002 chose to view rising energy prices as an alternative monetary
instrument. This is certainly the view supported by the FOMC statement, “the hesitancy
of economic expansion appears to owe importantly to oil price premiums.” (FOMC,
March 18, 2003) During a period when energy prices were generally trending higher, the
Federal Reserve elected to hold the fed funds target constant, perhaps to offset perceived
constrictive monetary effects from higher energy prices. This monetary reaction would
have been consistent with a study compiled by Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson where they
concluded that “a non-responsive monetary policy suffices to eliminate most of the
(negative) output effect of an oil price shock, particularly in the first 8-10 months.”
(Bernanke, Gertler, & Watson, May 1997, p. 27)
In my opinion, the general flaw of using energy prices as a proxy for monetary
policy is that energy use per capita is relatively inelastic. That is, most people's real
consumption of energy is more or less static in a given period. In comparison, debt levels
are extremely elastic given the prevailing interest rate. My sense is that, while using
rising energy prices to moderate consumption might work reasonably well, it seems a
weak argument that the same policy could effectively moderate or stimulate general
investment and credit levels.
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A second possibility exists as to why the Federal Reserve was so lagged in their
conventional monetary response. The possibility exists that the Federal Reserve
misinterpreted, either deliberately or through an oversight, the real inflation rate over the
period by failing to fully consider rapidly escalating housing costs. Gjerstad and Smith
discuss this possibility and the Bureau of Labor's tendency to understate real inflation by
only considering the rental equivalent value of residential real estate in the housing
element of the CPI. As rents were largely held in check by marginal increases in
personal income, the underlying property values and accompanying ownership costs were
allowed to escalate at rates far in excess of the stated inflation rate. Gjerstad and Smith
estimate that the CPI was understated by 2.9 percentage points in 2004 alone, or 6.2%
versus the stated CPI of 3.3%. Further, they estimate that over the period of 1999–2006,
home ownership costs increased 151% while CPI over the same period increased a very
modest 23%. (Gjerstad, 2009) I would submit that had the Federal Reserve given
accurate consideration to the real inflation rate, surely they would have recognized
inflation of 6.2% as well outside of any acceptable target and commenced conventional
monetary tightening much earlier.
Turning to the second question, that being whether or not unusually low interest
rates during the period in question (2002–2004) contributed to the credit bubble, the
empirical evidence seems fairly convincing. During the period in question, home
ownership in the US rose dramatically from a long term average and historically very
stable rate of 64.7% through 2002 to a high of 69.0% in 2005 and 2006. Put in absolute
terms, this surge in home building created an additional 4,672,000 homes based on US
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census data of the size of the average American household (US Census Bureau, 19652006).
Through the ingenuity of the financial services industry and the competitive
pressure of the market place, numerous financial institutions were either forced or
incented otherwise to create very innovative mortgage structures to capitalize on the large
spread described above between the nominal interest rate and the real inflation rate and
write mortgages for 4,672,000 (more or less) households who arguably could not have
qualified previously. Such vehicles as sub-prime mortgages, zero-down mortgages, no
income verification loans, and 125% loan-to-value mortgages were created to provide
affordable loans, affordable in the short term at least. The broad but erroneous
assumption was that US home prices would always appreciate, therefore there would
never be a problem repossessing the collateral if the over-leveraged homeowner fell
behind in their payments.
Insofar as virtually all of these creative loans carried variable rates tied to some
highly correlated variation of the fed funds rate (either through LIBOR, Prime Rate, or
some other mechanism), it was obviously only a matter of time before mortgage
payments would begin to escalate. Once the Federal Reserve finally did commence
raising the fed funds target in late 2004, the trouble began almost immediately. Very
similar in nature to the credit squeeze that wiped out LTCM, the mortgage defaults and
related home sales started to peak above average in 2006 and really began to accelerate
into 2007.
Home prices did not hold up as the lenders had expected. In certain of the more
inflated markets (California, Phoenix, Las Vegas, and Florida), home values fell as much
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as 50% or more. Nationally, home prices fell on average 31% from June, 2006 to April,
2009 (McGraw-Hill Companies, 2009). One could very effectively argue that the size of
the bubble created could be calculated simply by multiplying 4,672,000 (presumably) bad
mortgages by the average home price of roughly $225,000 for a credit bubble in excess of
$1 trillion.
It is important at this point not to be too critical of the Fed for holding short term
interest rates artificially low. The popular description at the time in the aftermath of the
dot.com bubble and 9/11 terrorist attacks was that the Fed was engineering a soft landing.
Arguably, had the Fed not held interest rates low at this time, it is pretty likely the
recession of 2001-2002 would have resumed as the budding recovery was still rather
tenuous and uncertain. Consequently, I believe that the Fed was faced with a “pick your
poison” dilemma. Had they allowed interest rates to begin rising much earlier in the
cycle, surely the housing bubble and sub-prime credit crisis could have been averted.
However, unemployment would have certainly risen to some unacceptable level which,
in the end, is really one of only two primary responsibilities of the Federal Reserve, the
other being guarding against inflation. At the end of the day, recognizing that nobody
has a crystal ball, I believe the Federal Reserve opted to defend against a sure and
immediate opponent of rising unemployment had they promoted higher interest rates,
rather than possibly a ghost opponent several years in the future from a credit expansion
on the back of low interest rates.
Theoretical Explanations for the Credit Crisis
Theoretical support for the international credit crisis can be found in several of the
business cycle theories. Schumpeter described the growth wave of the business cycle
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where credit and financial innovation will be necessary to provide the financial resources
for the new innovations to productivity of the cycle. However, he also emphasized the
need for banks to supply credit only to those who are creditworthy warning that “the
failure of bankers to exercise that ability accounts for most of the events which the
majority of observers would call catastrophes.” (Leathers, 2004, p. 671)
Obviously, banks were very creative with the financial innovations they came up
with to expand home ownership, but also extremely negligent in their failure to determine
the creditworthiness of their borrowers. This failure, according to Schumpeter, had to
result in “the creation of easy credit that drives speculative forces of the economy with
each loan tending to induce another and each rise in prices inducing another rise. Great
speculative manias develop in the financial markets, such as occurred in 1928-29.”
(Leathers, 2004, p. 672)
Minsky described alternative phases of the business cycle with the Financial
Instability Hypothesis. Center to the theory was that, contrary to the central theme of
neoclassical theory, a capitalist economy cannot settle at some equilibrium of prices,
wages, and full employment. Rather, certain “destabilizing forces” will exert themselves
to prevent equilibrium. For instance, full employment will necessarily create an upward
force on wages and prices. Conversely, policies seeking to maintain stable wages or
prices will exert pressure on investment returns and profitability and force unemployment
to move higher. (Minsky, 2008, pp. 11, 280)
In addition, like Schumpeter, Minsky advanced different phases of the business
cycle consistent with the various stages of instability. He described the “hedge phase,”
the “speculative phase,” and the “Ponzi phase.” During the hedge phase, economic units
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(defined as individuals or firms) finance their entire debt service obligations from current
income. As the destabilizing forces assert themselves, demand for investment begins to
accelerate and economic units assume more debt. It would seem that partially because
investment returns will begin to marginalize at this point and partially because borrowers
become more leveraged, more creative or innovative financial tools will emerge. Minsky
describes this phase as the speculative phase of the business cycle where economic units
have to roll over debt in order to finance existing obligations, essentially selling new debt
to retire old debt or effectively modifying debt provisions. These two phases would be
considered periods of stability or “relative tranquility,” which would be the closest thing
to equilibrium that Minsky allowed for. (Minsky, 2008, pp. 230-238)
It would seem that the period of 2002–2004 where the Federal Reserve continued
to hold the fed funds rate artificially low would constitute a speculative phase. Although
debt levels at this point were generally at a sustainable level, it was arguably only through
very high level financial innovation at the Federal Reserve that this was made possible, as
suggested previously by understating the real inflation rate.
It is during the Ponzi phase that investment bubbles are created. In both Minsky’s
description and relevant to the international credit crisis theme of this paper, economic
units either become so overly-optimistic about the prospects for future returns on
investment or so completely over-committed that they engage incrementally more and
more debt to the point that the debt service can only be met with the issuance of more
debt. Financial innovation will take on ever more creative and very likely complex
forms. (Minsky, 2008, p. 231)
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Minsky’s Ponzi phase is very reminiscent of the credit bubble in its late phase in
2007-2008. As described above, practically every reasonable mean for debt issuance had
been abandoned in order to feed an exponentially expanding monster in the US housing
market. As referenced above, the surge in home building and home ownership shortly
thereafter followed by the inevitable wave of foreclosures is good evidence that many of
the aggressive mortgages issued over this period were “Ponzi” in nature.
Unfortunately, the credit bubble was hardly contained to individual homeowners.
Numerous institutions were simultaneously caught up in Ponzi-type debt finance. At the
heart of virtually every collapse of a financial institution in 2008 was reckless debt
finance, that is, excessive leverage. Both Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (Lehman
Brothers Holdings, Inc., 2/29/2008) and Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc., 12/31/2007) had leveraged their asset capital 32:1 before they collapsed. Bear
Stearns Companies, Inc. was leveraged 34:1 prior to their failure. (Bear Stearns & Co.,
Inc., 2/29/2008) In order to compete for investment capital and to satisfy shareholder
demands for returns, as well as meet prior debt service demands, virtually every firm of a
financial nature was forced to engage in Ponzi-type finance by securing more and more
debt with the same collateral, that being their own relatively static equity.
In conclusion, it is fairly apparent that numerous events were put in play over a
period of at least 25 years that created an environment ripe for the major credit crisis of
2007-2009. Although I only mentioned the Savings and Loan crisis briefly, that whole
episode would certainly have to be characterized as an exercise in “too-big-to-fail.” The
engineered rescue of the counterparties of LTCM serves as further evidence of the
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Federal Reserve’s reluctant acceptance that certain institutions simply cannot be allowed
to fail.
Simultaneously, the broad trend towards deregulation sparked a rapid
consolidation of financial institutions. That is, during an era where firms where growing
and consolidating into financial behemoths anyway, the Federal Reserve, at least through
their actions if not their official statements, had unwittingly adopted an acceptance of the
too-big-to-fail principal for certain very large and very integrated firms.
Finally, the Federal Reserve did hold nominal short term interest rates artificially
low for an extended period. As discussed, the Federal Reserve was likely faced with a
difficult dilemma and consequently had little alternative beyond maintaining a loose
monetary policy. However, the fact remains that this policy did apparently heavily
contribute to the massive expansion of credit and ultimately the housing bubble and subprime credit crisis.
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Chapter Two: The Federal Reserve and Conventional Monetary Policy
Chapter two will briefly recount the events and turmoil of the credit crisis of
2007-2009 in order to build a level of familiarity for the reader and hopefully place in
context the extreme conditions that prevailed at the time. As will be illustrated, the credit
crisis climaxed in September, 2008 with such shock and panic that most every market
around the world fell into freefall. It was in this extreme environment that central banks
around the world, but primarily the Federal Reserve, were forced to accelerate their
normal prescribed remedies for rising liquidity demand, which shall be referred to
collectively as conventional monetary policy.
The Great Recession: 2007-2009
At the time that the sub-prime mortgage market began to roll over in 2007, most
felt it would slowly deflate and be a largely over-hyped affair. In testimony to Congress
as late as March, 2007, Fed Chairman Bernanke stated “the impact on the broader
economy and the financial markets of the problems in the subprime market are likely to
be contained.” (Bernanke, Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of the US
Congress, March 28, 2007) I think the truth is that very few people outside of the
boardrooms of the financial institutions involved understood the complexity of the
structures that had been put in place by these institutions. Nor did anyone on the outside
realize how aggressively these institutions had pursued these Ponzi-type structures.
However, inside the boardroom, in order to drive competitive earnings growth and for
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fear of losing market share, and probably just plain ego, many of the biggest financial
institutions in the country and around the world had approved the aggressive leverage of
their firm’s equity capital into subprime mortgages.
As discussed above, the Fed finally began raising the fed funds rate in late 2004.
By 2006, the fed funds rate was back up to 5.25 where it held steady into early 2008 (see
Figure 1). The higher interest rate was effectively the catalyst that caused the wholesale
and massive default of many of the subprime loans written in only the prior three years.
At the same time, however, GDP was expanding at sustainable and comfortable rates of
around 2.0% for most of 2007 and into 2008. The general feeling was that the US
economy was large enough and diverse enough to absorb the weight of these mortgage
defaults.
Chronology of the Collapse
That sentiment changed literally overnight in September, 2008 with the failure of
Lehman Brothers, Inc. Although several other firms had failed prior to Lehman Brothers,
Inc., most notably, Countrywide Financial Corp., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bear Stearns
& Co., Inc., and Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., the system had proven resilient enough to
absorb those institutions. Countrywide Financial Corp. and Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
were each acquired by Bank of America Corporation. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
being quasi-government institutions to begin with, were seized by the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA) and re-capitalized fairly quickly. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. was
acquired by JP Morgan Chase & Co.
It seems that Lehman Brothers, Inc. had the particular misfortune of being the
“best” capitalized of the bad institutions, which put Lehman in the unenviable position of
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being one of the last firms to fail. By the time they ultimately failed in September, 2008
there simply was not the physical capital necessary at any of the larger institutions to
absorb Lehman or the political capital or appetite at the Treasury to rescue them. Fed
Governor Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Paulson made the decision to allow Lehman
Brothers, Inc. to file for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.
Lehman’s bankruptcy sparked a chain reaction of failed counterparty transactions,
investor panic, and 21st century style bank runs. Essentially, that meant massive
movements of money electronically into government insured deposits. In fact, in order to
prevent a complete collapse of the money market industry, the Fed was forced to step up
and guarantee these deposits as well when several large money market funds “broke the
buck,” the result of massive liquidations.
Without going into a great description of the intricate events and extensive
transactions involved with Lehman’s failure, which truthfully may never be fully
understood, it is fair to conclude that Lehman’s failure was ultimately the tipping point of
a rather tenuous US economy. The system was under enough stress, both
psychologically and financially, that the Lehman shock caused credit markets to simply
freeze up. Large businesses could not access the commercial paper market for which
they had grown very dependant for meeting short term demands for cash, such as payroll.
Similarly, small businesses could not access their credit lines to facilitate their short term
obligations, again such as payroll. Banks put the brakes on consumers by slashing credit
limits on credit cards and suddenly adopting actual lending standards. Everything came
to such an abrupt halt over the course of a few days that the media chatter turned
overnight from debate over whether the US would successfully avoid a technical
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recession to discussions of how deep the recession would be, how long it would be, and
whether or not the entire financial system would simply collapse.
Conventional Monetary Policy
Recognizing that the US economy was slipping towards recession early in 2008,
the Federal Reserve was quick to employ the more conventional tools of monetary policy
at their disposal. At this point, the Federal Reserve was really dealing with a more
conventional recession from the economic peaks of a fairly normal business cycle.
Falling under the category of fed funds policy, the FOMC began aggressively cutting the
fed funds target early in the year. At an unscheduled meeting on January 22, that rate
was cut from 4.25% to 3.50%. Again, that rate was cut at the scheduled meeting a week
later to 3.0%. By April 30, 2008, the fed funds rate stood at a historically low 2.0%.
(Federal Reserve Bank , 2008, p. 3)
It seems fairly intuitive that the Federal Reserve had very little capacity left to
stimulate the money supply through conventional means should that become necessary or
desirable. In fact, that is exactly what materialized. By the summer of 2008, a relatively
benign recession was complicated considerably by the international credit crisis. With
the flurry of bank and investment company failures that climaxed in September, the
Federal Reserve had very little capacity left to affect liquidity or stimulate investment
further through interest rate reductions. After all, nominal interest rates can’t go below
zero. (Yates, 2003, pp. 27-37) The Federal Reserve did cut the fed funds target again
finally to a range of 0.0% - 0.25% by year end, which was the lowest rate for the fed
funds target in US history. (Yates, 2003, pp. 27-37)
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In my opinion, the primary impact of the Fed’s move in this respect was really
more political and symbolic than anything else. Insofar as the financial institutions at this
point were struggling to reduce their balance sheets and simply survive, they really were
not interested in or actively pursuing the origination of new loans at any interest rate. I
would argue that the real effect of taking the fed funds target to a range of 0.0% - 0.25%
was simply to demonstrate to Congress that all that could be done conventionally had
been exhausted and that more liquidity was still needed.
The second conventional tool of monetary policy available to the Federal Reserve,
and arguably the much more powerful instrument, is the ability to affect the supply of
money through Open Market Operations. According to the Federal Reserve’s own
statement, “Prior to mid-September (2008), the (FOMC) Desk had been able to offset the
effect of the additional reserve balances provided through new or expanded liquidity
facilities, and it relied upon its traditional framework and operating procedures to control
the federal funds rate.” (Federal Reserve Bank , 2008, p. 6) However, after September
15, the Fed was simply overwhelmed with liquidity demand from its member banking
institutions. In Keynes’ terminology, liquidity preference of banks and in turn banking
customers had exploded and simply overwhelmed the available money supply from
normal conventions.
Simply stated, banking institutions were caught in a liquidity trap and were forced
to sell off assets very aggressively, thereby rapidly shrinking their balance sheets. Insofar
as the credit markets were effectively frozen, the Federal Reserve had to step in as the
buyer of last resort and purchase these assets from the banks, thereby injecting the
necessary liquidity demanded by the banks. In effect, banking institutions were allowed
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to transfer billions of reserves from their collective balance sheets onto the Federal
Reserve thereby dramatically expanding the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. It’s
important to recognize that at this point, the assets that transferred were primarily US
Treasury obligations issued through the normal course of Fed Open Market Operations in
prior periods, or simply the creation of the same in order to meet the overwhelming
liquidity demand. At this point, none of the much publicized “toxic assets” of the
banking institutions have been addressed.
The last tool of conventional monetary policy open to the Federal Reserve is
adjustments to the required reserve ratio for banks. Nothing was pursued in this respect
as it would have obviously been ineffective, both politically and in practice. The political
uproar that would have certainly ensued had the Federal Reserve cut the required reserve
ratio at a time when these same financial institutions had gotten themselves into so much
trouble by largely ignoring their debt ratios anyway would surely have been enormous.
In addition, it is very unlikely that the banks would have increased loan activity at all
simply by leveraging a reduced ratio. As described above, these institutions were
aggressively engaged in a massive deleveraging campaign at the time to shrink their
balance sheets. In fact, the liquidity made available by the Federal Reserve largely was
simply horded by the financial industry. According to Federal Reserve data, as the credit
crisis climaxed, the banking industry amassed huge excess reserves, in sum totaling in
excess of $750 billion by December, 2008. For comparison, prior to the credit crisis and
the Fed’s liquidity push, total industry excess reserves stood at less than $2 billion in any
given period. (Federal Reserve Bank, 2010)
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The extent to which these tools achieved the desired effect is mixed. It seems safe
to assume that the Fed’s massive balance sheet expansion through the Open Market
Operations mechanism prevented an international run on the banks reminiscent of the
1930’s. Depositors were allowed to access their money so at least the confidence that
their deposits were secure was never much of an issue. Without the aggressive actions of
the Federal Reserve, it is really not too difficult to imagine a panic situation where banks
could have been forced to close their doors. Such a panic would surely have sparked an
international crisis of confidence that could have taken down the entire international
banking system very much reminiscent of the Great Depression. Therefore, I would
argue that the expansive Open Market Operations that the Federal Reserve engaged in
was very successful in arresting the liquidity crisis and the crisis of confidence.
The effect of rapidly cutting the fed funds target rate to a range of 0% - 0.25%
was probably not so successful for a couple of reasons. First of all, it takes a long time
for liquidity to matriculate through the monetary system, and we simply did not have a
long time as evidenced by the sense of urgency displayed by Treasury Secretary Paulson
and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke during the TARP deliberations before
Congress in late September and early October. Second of all, the overwhelming demand
at the time was for liquidity of existing financial assets (which had been met with the
Open Market Operations described above), not for investment related borrowing and its
accompanying leverage, which is generally the aim of easing the fed funds rate to begin
with.
In addition, the shortfalls of interest-rate targeting in monetary policy to stimulate
investment and consumption is well documented. That is, the "pushing on a string"
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dilemma, which is at the heart of the deflationary liquidity trap conundrum. Although the
Federal Reserve can make monetary conditions conducive to lending, at the end of the
day they cannot force financial institutions to actually lend, anymore than they can force
investors to borrow. Very empiric evidence of this inadequacy of monetary policy was
seen in late 2008 and 2009. Although the fed funds target was held steady at a very
"conducive" level of 0.0% - 0.25%, lending activity was very anemic as demonstrated in
Figure 3.
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Figure 3 (Federal Reserve Bank, Q1 2001 - Q2 2009)
The reasons for the anemic loan activity virtually define the "pushing on a string"
dilemma of monetary policy. On the one hand, liquidity preference in this environment
was surging amongst investors; consequently money flowed almost exclusively into
extremely short-term treasuries with virtually no demand for any other security or
maturity. In fact, at the height of the crisis, short-term interest rates actually were
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negative for several days. That is, credit supply from traditional institutional depositors
was nonexistent.
At the same time, banking institutions were very likely engaged in heavy credit
rationing as well, thereby further restricting credit supply. As discussed previously, the
primary concern of financial institutions at the time was to raise liquidity thereby
reducing their capital ratios. Once again, the liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve
was simply used to raise bank reserves. Underwriting new loans, for which there was no
demand anyway, at that point would simply have neutralized the bank's efforts to
deleverage themselves.
With short-term interest rates cut to effectively 0% and the immediate liquidity
needs of the banking system satisfied from aggressive Open Market Operations, the
Federal Reserve had effectively exhausted all conventional monetary tools available. Yet
even with that massive liquidity injection, it rapidly became apparent that conventional
monetary tools alone would be inadequate to avert a deep recession, if not an outright
depression. Minutes of the December 2008 FOMC meeting confirmed the deep concern
of the Federal Reserve in this respect. (FOMC, 2008) It would seem that the FOMC was
priming the markets as well as selling Congress on the need for a heavy push into the
realm of highly stimulative "Quantitative Easing." The following excerpts from the
December 2008 FOMC meeting suggest this idea.
With the federal funds rate already trading at very low levels as a result of the
large volume of excess reserves associated with the Federal Reserve's liquidity
operations (that is, Open Market Operations), participants agreed that the
committee would need to focus on other tools to impart additional monetary
stimulus to the economy in the near-term.
Meeting participants also discussed how best to employ the Federal Reserve's
balance sheet to promote monetary policy goals.
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Participants discussed the merits of purchasing large quantities of longer-term
securities such as agency debt, agency mortgage-backed securities, and Treasury
securities. The available evidence indicated that such purchases would reduce
yields on those instruments, and lower yields on the securities would tend to
reduce borrowing costs for a range of private borrowers, although participants
were uncertain as to the likely size of such effects. (FOMC, 2008)
In response to these fears and deep concerns that threatened "sustainable
economic growth and price stability," the Federal Reserve did embark down a
nonconventional and fairly controversial path of quantitative easing, which will be
discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three: The Federal Reserve and Unconventional Monetary Policy
Chapter three will discuss some of the tools that central banks might deploy
within what would still be considered a “monetary” vein after the more conventional
monetary tools have been exhausted without generating satisfactory stimulative effects.
The reader will note the emphasis on “stimulative” effects, which obviously implies
expansionary policy and efforts to ease or reverse an economic recession, rather than to
curb the “irrational exuberance” that typifies a cyclical peak. I would argue that very
little could be written in regards to unconventional monetary policy tools and their
application to force a moderation of economic activity at a cycle top as conventional
monetary policy tools have historically proven very effective at reigning in price inflation
and excessive investment speculation to the extent they are applied timely and
apolitically. This is largely due to the fact that there is no converse to the “zero bound for
nominal interest rates” problem when reigning in inflation, that is, interest rates can be
raised indefinitely. Therefore, this paper will only discuss the tools of unconventional
monetary policy and their application to stimulate economic activity and inject money
balances.
This section will discuss the primary tool of unconventional monetary policy; that
which has come to be called “Quantitative Easing.” A second form of unconventional
monetary policy likely exists which involves the manipulation or depreciation of
currency exchange rates to favor domestic production and the domestic economy. This
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paper will not go into much discussion of this strategy for two reasons. First, currency
exchange rate depreciation is very similar in theory and in practice to most of the existing
Import Substitution models readily available insofar as the general objective is to
stimulate domestic production (and economic activity) at the expense of likely cheaper
imported goods, that is, cheaper in the absence of synthetic barriers. Any discussion
along these lines would likely result in simply restating the discussion and analysis of
these models. Secondly, to the extent that trading partners of the central bank in question
can pretty easily neutralize any currency depreciation by simply depreciating their
currency as well, I would argue that this strategy would ultimately generate currency
neutrality and therefore be deemed ineffective except in the very short term and only then
with the coordination of other central banks.
Quantitative Easing
Quantitative easing is a term that has been thrown around quite frequently lately
with different definitions depending on the source. For the purposes of this paper,
quantitative easing is defined to be central bank activities, either independent or
coordinated with other central banks, to facilitate the creation and injection of massive
amounts of liquidity into the money supply through various unconventional avenues in
order to satisfy overwhelming short term liquidity demands of the markets. The money
supply, or the monetary base, follows a pretty conventional definition of currency in
circulation plus bank reserves on deposit with the central bank. As discussed above,
quantitative easing is a highly stimulative strategy that has been used rarely in the era of
central bank coordinated monetary policy and only when conventional monetary tools
have failed to bring about adequate stimulation in the face of some extraordinary shock.
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The purpose, quite simply, is to rapidly inject necessary liquidity into the monetary base
to a level where; first of all, extraordinarily high liquidity demand of both banks and
borrowers is satisfied and, second, to hopefully take the next step in a recovery and
sufficiently incent banks and investors to actively engage at least some of the newly
formed capital into investment projects and create economic activity.
Two fundamental questions will be addressed. First, what is the likelihood that
quantitative easing can succeed in stimulating economic activity where more tested and
familiar conventional monetary policy measures failed? More specifically, given an
economy that has fallen into a deflationary spiral, how effective can we expect
quantitative easing to not only arrest the falling price environment and return some
measure of pricing stability but also potentially spark a renewed level of economic
expansion as measured by expanding production and higher prices? Secondly, given that
the direct objective of quantitative easing is to neutralize a deflationary environment with
highly stimulative inflationary programs, what is the likelihood that the central bank
might overshoot the mark and unwittingly ignite an unacceptably high inflationary
environment? Before addressing these questions, however, it is necessary to review more
deeply the tools and mechanics behind quantitative easing as well as discuss the
theoretical basis and empirical analysis of two historical quantitative easing efforts.
The Tools and Mechanics behind Quantitative Easing
Passive quantitative easing.
Pradhan differentiated between two different approaches to quantitative easing,
that being passive quantitative easing and active quantitative easing. (Pradhan, March 5,
2009) Under normal economic circumstances where a central bank is charged with
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maintaining an established monetary base from day to day, the central bank will offset, or
sterilize, any activity that its member banks engage in to alter the monetary base. For
instance, if a member bank writes a loan against its reserves thereby increasing the
money supply by the amount of the loan, the central bank will typically sell a
corresponding sum of assets from its balance sheet into the open market and neutralize
the monetary effect of the bank loan. Passive quantitative easing is created when a
central bank simply refrains from the sterilization process and allows the monetary base
to expand “naturally” by the amount of the loan. Conversely, when a member bank
engages in a transaction to reduce the monetary base, for instance by depositing with the
central bank its excess reserves, the central bank might be inclined to sterilize that
transaction by buying in the open market a corresponding amount of securities, thereby
offsetting the transaction and maintaining the monetary base.
Two characteristics of passive quantitative easing are fairly apparent. First of all,
it cannot afford the central bank much control over the actual size of the monetary base as
the central bank will simply be reacting to the actions of its member banks and individual
agents, thus is the nature of most passive acts. Second of all, economic agents tend to
move slowly and cautiously, especially in periods of extreme deflationary economic
inactivity. As we have seen in the 2007-2009 recession, nobody has been too inclined to
invest in a new home, or anything else for that matter, when the likelihood is high that
they can buy the same asset later at a cheaper price. In situations where the central bank
wants to rapidly expand the monetary supply, it seems that passive quantitative easing
might support the broad agenda, but would be too slow to meaningfully expand the
monetary base quickly and would therefore be largely ineffective on its own.
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Active quantitative easing.
Active quantitative easing can probably be most easily thought of as aggressive
and unconventional efforts by the central bank very similar in nature to regular open
market operations, but expanded both vertically to include broader and more risky assets
and horizontally by expanding the central bank’s balance sheet dramatically. To date, as
will be seen shortly, central banks have employed two quantitative easing tools in a
natural progression once they are satisfied that conventional monetary policy has created
a sustained zero (or low) interest rate environment.
The first tool I will refer to as central bank balance sheet restructuring. As the
name implies, this strategy is a vertically oriented strategy that a central bank can engage
relatively easily by simply announcing its willingness to accept alternative asset classes
as either loan collateral or that the central bank will buy outright from member banks. As
was pointed out earlier in the description of conventional monetary tools, the central bank
will typically only accept very limited types of very liquid collateral in exchange for cash
reserves issued to member banks. Historically, that meant debt obligations originally
issued by the central bank to begin with (that is, treasury securities in the case of the
Federal Reserve). However, when a central bank engages in what I have deemed central
bank balance sheet restructuring, the central bank will engage in progressively more
aggressive purchases and exchanges of alternative assets that normally would not be
accepted in order to facilitate much more liquidity. In this sense, the strategy is vertically
oriented because the balance sheet of the central bank will become much more diversified
beyond traditional excess bank reserves. However, it is important to emphasize that the
size of the central bank’s balance sheet is materially unchanged.
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Because this strategy will not have a material impact on the size of the central
bank’s balance sheet, it can be engaged pretty easily without appealing to or approval
from the governments legislative body. In fact, in the case of the Federal Reserve, which
is a relatively private and secretive institution by nature, such asset purchases can be
made without congressional knowledge. This advantage certainly would allow for
quicker access to liquidity insofar as it is unnecessary to go through the time consuming
and potentially contentious bureaucratic channels of legislation. This may be very
important given the speed with which a troubled institution can collapse once word
spreads in the markets that such an institution is potentially illiquid or potentially
insolvent.
A second characteristic of simply restructuring the central bank balance sheet is
that it can afford the central bank to very precisely target specific assets for purchase.
Rather than relying on the low interest rate environment to provide liquidity to specific,
presumably more troubled institutions, the central bank can quietly, very precisely, and in
large volume buy up non-traditional assets of these more troubled institutions thereby
injecting necessary liquidity. To the extent that such an injection can be done quietly and
prevent a “bear raid” on such an institution by speculators or a bank run by depositors
that might exceed FDIC limits or spill over into non-FDIC insured assets, I would argue
that the central bank can prevent capital raids that create a self fulfilling prophecy of a
bank failure.
The second tool of active quantitative easing I will refer to as central bank
balance sheet expansion. Again as the name implies, under this strategy, the central
bank will expand its balance sheet materially, possibly dramatically, in order to satisfy
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liquidity demand even in excess of what could be supplied through the previous
measures. Under this tactic, the central bank will use a more horizontal strategy by
bringing its ability to expand its balance sheet virtually indefinitely and simply create the
cash reserves necessary to satisfy liquidity demand. In a very real sense, the central bank
simply “prints” fiat currency which is then used to buy real assets from distressed banks
and investors.
When you think about it, the whole process really is a pretty good deal for the
central bank and by extension the government. The central bank will book the asset
purchases on its balance sheet while the member banks and depositors book the cash they
received as assets on their books. In reality, the net impact on the overall balance sheet
of everyone involved (central bank, member bank, depositor) is zero. The central bank
merely created an amount of currency equal to whatever the original holder of the asset
would settle for in order to satisfy their desire for liquidity, that is, cash. On the other
side of the equation, the central bank really could think of the currency issued almost as a
deed of trust on the assets they bought. The intent is that once the markets stabilize and
greed or animal spirits return to investors, the central bank will sell the unconventional
assets back in the marketplace, retire the currency issued, and get back into the business
of conventional monetary policy. The currency issued was almost a placeholder.
Unfortunately, as will be seen, quantitative easing in reality is not quite so simple.
This balance sheet expansion strategy, which will necessarily follow central bank
balance sheet restructuring in a natural progression, is probably the most controversial
tactic for one primary reason. The politics of merely mentioning “printing money”
understandably conjures up images of the Weimar Republic or the 1970’s inflation spiral
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in the US. However, a very important distinction is that the central bank in a quantitative
easing campaign is printing money first of all to satisfy a panic stricken public that will
not settle for any other asset. Second of all, the central bank is using the printed money
to actually buy hard tangible assets that are presumably temporarily out of favor. In the
case of the Weimar Republic, currency was simply printed and distributed to pay
obligations of the government. The 1970’s US inflation spiral, I would argue, was a
considerably different and special situation tied more to the US dollar simply finding an
equilibrium level against other foreign currencies after being decoupled from the gold
standard in 1971.
The natural question that arises would be as to what asset classes should the
central bank start buying in order to give quantitative easing the best chance of success.
It would seem the central bank should consider two parameters in addressing this
question. The first parameter, as Benford et al established, is for quantitative easing to be
big and it must inject liquidity quickly. Therefore it is imperative that the central bank
target a particular asset class with a sufficient supply of assets that can be readily
liquidated. (Benford, Berry, Nikolov, & Young, 2009, p. 92) For example, the
quantitative easing efforts of several central banks in 2007-2009 included the purchase of
commercial paper and corporate bonds by the Bank of Japan as well as US Treasuries
and mortgage backed securities of various government sponsored entities (GSE’s) by the
US Federal Reserve. (Benford, Berry, Nikolov, & Young, 2009, p. 92) In each case, the
market for these securities is not only huge, but also very diverse. Consequently, central
bank purchases of these securities effectively injected a huge amount of stimulus very
quickly. In addition, that stimulus ran very deep and very broad across hundreds of
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thousands, if not millions, of investors. Satisfying the vertical nature of central bank
balance sheet restructuring, many new asset classes were purchased.
In addressing the second parameter, the central bank may be able to take very
meaningful cues from the market to help determine what assets to purchase in order to
reasonably expect to arrest a liquidity trap and an associated panic. As discussed above,
active quantitative easing may become necessary in periods of extreme deflationary
shocks where the “zero-bound” of nominal interest rates prevents conventional monetary
policy from creating adequate loan activity and the associated monetary stimulus. It is
therefore presumed, by virtue of the condition that nominal interest rates will have to be
at or near zero before quantitative easing should commence, that investor demand for
liquidity will necessarily be at an extraordinary premium. That is, credit markets and
money markets alike will by definition be caught in an upside-down state consistent with
a liquidity trap. Therefore, it would seem that targeting the purchase of assets caught up
in such a liquidity trap would dramatically improve the chance for success. To the
extent that such assets might hold an underlying intrinsic value (for instance, secured and
collateralized notes), but due to the general nature of a liquidity trap (as detailed above),
the market price in no way reflects the underlying intrinsic value, such assets might
represent an excellent opportunity to not only arrest the liquidity trap, but might even
provide an opportunity for the central bank to make some money for the taxpayer once
things normalize and the assets can be sold back to the market possibly at higher prices.
In such an extreme environment as was seen in the autumn of 2008, with the
exception of only the most secure and liquid government bills, prices of literally
everything came unglued. Quite simply, liquidity preference at any cost had trumped the
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banking industry’s ability to issue more and more debt. As a result, normal risk/reward
characteristics were replaced with an absolute rejection of any risk; whether it was
default risk, credit risk, or inflation risk was immaterial. It is very important to realize
that, whether the central bank comes forward with quantitative easing or not in such an
extreme environment, investor panic and the herd mentality will dictate that everyone
who wants to be liquid will be made so, regardless of price. If the principal and
characteristics of deflation mean anything, it is that prices (or real inflation) can and will
fall at rates far below zero, possibly for extended periods, until the panic subsides and the
market can find a bid, natural or otherwise, for these securities.
Under this second parameter, aggressive active quantitative easing may be used to
satisfy the massive liquidity demand without necessarily forcing investors of otherwise
sound assets to sell into a market where there is no bid for their assets. Essentially, the
idea is for the central bank to create a “bid” for certain asset classes to satisfy the massive
call for liquidity in hopes of arresting the panic and the margin calls.
Theoretical Basis for Quantitative Easing
The theoretical justification for quantitative easing, to the extent that quantitative
easing is really just a massive monetary response to extraordinary market conditions, can
be found most readily in Keynes General Theory of the Rate of Interest. Keynes defined
interest rates as “the price which equilibrates the desire to hold wealth in the form of cash
with the availability of cash.” (Keynes, 1964, p. 167) Keynes further described that
higher long term interest rates and lower short term interest rates would be the result of
higher levels of liquidity preference and that in such an environment money supplies
would be inadequate to meet the demand for money.
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Not only does Keynes theory provide the basis for monetarism and centralized
monetary policy in general, it also seems to reasonably describe the circumstances that
unfolded prior to the banking and international credit crisis of 2007-2009. In response to
unprecedented liquidity demand, nominal interest rates were forced to near zero. In fact,
possibly taking Keynes understanding of interest rates beyond even what Keynes allowed
for, as mentioned previously, short term T-bills actually traded at levels to yield negative
interest rates for brief periods. The scenario that played out seems to fit the Keynesian
view of interest rates as a reward for illiquidity, or at least the natural reciprocal of that
theory that people suddenly cared only about “return of their money, as opposed to return
on their money.” As Keynes had stated, there simply was not enough money in
circulation to meet the overwhelming liquidity demand as very few investors were
willing to buy less liquid paper.
Finally, Keynes General Theory of the Rate of Interest provides a good theoretical
illustration for monetary policy and its ability to meet liquidity preference. Keynes
advanced the equation M = La(r) where M is the monetary base, La is a function that
describes liquidity preference (or demand for money as an asset), and r is the interest rate.
Peterson and Estenson illustrated this relationship in Figure 4 below where P represents a
normal business cycle peak; T represents a normal business cycle trough. (Peterson &
Estenson, 1996, p. 160)
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Figure 4 – Keynes General Theory of the Rate of Interest
The reader might note that I have modified the shape of the La = f(r) demand
curve by allowing it to intersect the La axis at r = 0. This is to illustrate the lower bound
of zero for interest rates in periods of extreme liquidity preference. In addition, I have
modified the same curve such that it never intersects r illustrating that interest rates have
no upper limit as a monetary response to inflation or periods of extremely low liquidity
preference. MaO represents Peterson and Estenson’s depiction of the supply curve of
money as an asset as autonomous to the interest rate. Under this Figure 4, the monetary
base that can be controlled by the central bank through the conventional monetary tools
discussed in Chapter 2 would be that area of the La axis where La intersects the axis up to
LaT. In addition, the area of the La axis where La intersects between LaP and LaT
represents normal fluctuations of the money supply in response to a normal business
cycle. That area of the La axis where La intersects from 0 to LaP represents the monetary
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base during periods of unacceptably high inflation where the central bank would be
raising interest rates aggressively beyond what would be expected in a normal business
cycle in order to dramatically contract the money supply. The area of the La axis where
La intersects beyond LaT represents asset demand for money (liquidity preference) beyond
what can be satisfied by conventional monetary policy and therefore the area of most
interest for this paper.
It is important to understand that the MaO money supply curve is dynamic in that it
can, or at least should, move in lock step with variations to La. That is, MaT = f(LaT), MaP
= f(LaP), and so on. However, at points of the La axis beyond LaT, r < 0 is not possible,
indicating the zero bound of nominal interest rates. Therefore, in order to satisfy demand
for Ma at points beyond LaT, the liquidity required will necessarily be forthcoming from
other sources. The argument presented herein is that the source of additional liquidity
will be forthcoming from the various unconventional monetary policy tools described,
primarily quantitative easing.
A possible shift in Keynes precautionary motive.
Digging a little deeper into Keynes General Theory of the Rate of Interest, he
further identified three divisions of liquidity preference; the transactions motive, the
precautionary motive, and the speculative motive. Keynes suggested that the
transactional motive and the precautionary motive would most likely remain insensitive
to interest rates and therefore remain relatively determined by income over time, but that
the speculative motive would account for the overwhelming stress on the money supply
in periods of disequilibrium. (Peterson & Estenson, 1996, pp. 170-171) The
precautionary motive Keynes defined as the desire for security as to the future cash
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equivalent of a certain proportion of total resources. (Keynes, 1964, p. 170) Ordinarily,
this component is bound into a culture and determined by very sticky things like savings
rates, public safety nets, and confidence about the future, which arguably are normally
very static characteristics.
However, it seems plausible that a sudden and fundamental shift in the general
population’s precautionary motive likely took place in the autumn of 2008. At that time,
the crisis of liquidity and the absolute rejection of risk altogether arguably transformed
the precautionary demand for liquidity into a wildly dynamic and unpredictable
component overnight. This possibility could offer another explanation as to why
conventional monetary policy was limited by the zero-bound of nominal interest rates and
more aggressive tools became necessary. It would seem that conventional monetary
policy is generally aimed at satisfying the more conventional speculative motive for
liquidity preference, that is, central bank sterilization of speculative transactions, as well
as the more predictable aspects of the transactions motive and the precautionary motive.
If it indeed transpired that suddenly the precautionary motive shifted dramatically, it is
very understandable how the money supply and the central bank were simply unprepared
and ill-equipped to meet the overwhelming liquidity demand that previously had never
really been expected or accounted for.
Empirical Analysis of Quantitative Easing: Japan 2001-2005
The first concerted and relatively complete example of quantitative easing can be
seen in the efforts of the Bank of Japan (BoJ) during the period 2001-2005. The impact
of the collapse of the Japanese asset bubble in 1998 on the banks was enormous as much
of that bubble had been financed with inflated stock and real estate assets pledged as
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collateral on bank loans. Very similar to the international credit crisis of 2007-2009, as
the bubble began to deflate and the value of the underlying assets began to collapse,
Japanese banks suddenly realized they were holding massive amounts of bad loans for
which the collateral had “evaporated.” Strong and secure collateralized loans morphed
overnight into unsecured non-performing loans. As described above, individual banks
were deeply degraded and their own solvency came into question, which genuinely
threatened the entire Japanese banking system with collapse. The initial response to the
liquidity problem by the BoJ was to adopt a zero interest rate policy very similar in
character to the conventional monetary policy discussed in Chapter 2 in the sense that the
stated intent was to encourage investment as much as possible within the generally
accepted conventional monetary framework.
A key difference in the BoJ’s conventional response to the Federal Reserve’s
response a few years later may be that the BoJ formally adopted a zero interest rate
policy, which may be effective in raising confidence of the markets that the central bank
will remain committed to a zero interest rate for a considerable time period and until
prices and economic activity satisfy a predetermined standard. In this case, the standard
was set at price stabilization as measured by the Japanese CPI. (Baba, Nishioka, Oda,
Shirakawa, Ueda, & Ugai, February 2005, p. 72) In contrast, the Federal Reserve has
never formally adopted a zero interest rate policy. Rather, it seems to prefer perhaps a
more elusive policy by making accommodative statements without necessarily painting
themselves into a corner with absolute statements and formal policies. Only after the
zero interest rate policy failed to produce the desired investment and private sector
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activity did the BoJ advance the idea of further stimulus in the form of quantitative
easing.
The quantitative easing policy set in place by the BoJ consisted of three
coordinated strategies. (Ugai, March 2007) First, the BoJ set a liquidity target to guard
against perhaps injecting too much stimulus while still providing sufficient liquidity to
fund investment and exports. This was accomplished by replacing a standardized interest
rate target, in this case the uncollateralized overnight call rate, with a money stock or
balance as measured by the Japanese current account balance (surplus) in excess of BoJ
required reserves.
Secondly, the BoJ widely communicated its intent to continue its quantitative
easing policy for as long as necessary until the Japanese CPI registered zero or a yearover-year increase. Obviously, this action provides markets and investors with a higher
level of certainty and confidence that low to zero interest rates will prevail for as long as
a deflationary environment persists.
Finally, the structure of the quantitative easing was defined. The BoJ would
aggressively step up its purchase of long term Japanese government bonds beyond and in
addition to what it had committed to under the zero interest rate policy. The ceiling was
set essentially to the entire outstanding inventory of Japanese government bonds. In
addition, the BoJ announced it would commence purchasing certain asset-backed
securities as well in order to provide additional liquidity, but also to start facilitating a
more functional market for such securities.
An empirical analysis of the impact of quantitative easing to the Japanese
economy will follow in order to assess the first question posed of quantitative easing; that
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being, whether or not quantitative easing might likely have a stimulative impact, and
therefore a likely successful impact, on an otherwise failing economy. In making such a
determination, I will make two observations. First, the degree to which it can be
determined that quantitative easing can be credited with arresting the deflationary spiral
prematurely and therefore prevented prices from falling to some “natural” level. This
first observation will clearly attempt to assess how well quantitative easing might satisfy
extraordinary liquidity demand and therefore reinstitute a level of price stability and
general economic stability, albeit it at lower levels. Second, the degree to which
quantitative easing could be credited with actually sparking and/or financing an economic
recovery. Each of these relatively independent assessments is temporal in nature and
follows a natural progression in the business cycle. It is therefore not necessary for
quantitative easing to be deemed successful on both counts to be deemed an appropriate
device in a central bank’s toolbox for dealing with deflationary pressures and liquidity
shortages.
Following Keynes Liquidity Preference Theory of Interest, the primary
determinant of interest rates is the willingness of savers to part with liquidity. (Keynes,
1964, p. 167) As already discussed, in a deflationary spiral, liquidity demand will exceed
the supply of liquidity available in the monetary system. Absent quantitative easing or
some other such subsidy, selling of illiquid assets must therefore ensue in order to satisfy
exceedingly high liquidity demand, which necessarily generates price discounts.
Therefore, if the optimal interest rate* could be reasonably determined, it would most

*

For the purposes of this paper, the optimal interest rate is a largely theoretical interest rate somewhat
similar to the Wicksellian natural rate of interest in the sense that it is that rate of interest that would equate
the supply of capital with the demand for investment.
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assuredly be negative. However, owing to the lower bound of zero for nominal interest
rates, the presumably negative optimal rate of interest cannot be expressed accurately in a
familiar nominal term. In order to satisfy the overwhelmingly high demand for liquidity,
individuals become more agreeable to steeper and more severe price discounts of asset
prices in order to generate any amount of liquidity. In this respect, although the optimal
interest rate cannot be stated in a traditional nominal interest rate quote, it is nevertheless
still realized in the form of falling prices. In other words, liquidity demand over and
above what can be generated by simply rotating into ultra short maturity t-bills will be
met by selling off more illiquid assets.
If it can be demonstrated empirically that quantitative easing created by the BoJ
created a price floor or even a strengthening price environment, one would have to credit
the quantitative easing effort with calming a panic stricken public and with easing
liquidity demands by postponing panicked or forced asset sales. In addition, firming
price levels would certainly indicate that the negative optimal interest rate was trending
less negative and back towards parity with the nominal rate of zero. Under those
conditions, I would argue that quantitative easing in Japan was successful in arresting the
deflationary spiral.
Baba et al analyzed the empirical effects of the BoJ’s extraordinary monetary
policy efforts, specifically the zero interest rate policy and the quantitative easing
program. (Baba, Nishioka, Oda, Shirakawa, Ueda, & Ugai, February 2005, pp. 72-80) In
their analysis, Baba et al estimated the shape of a theoretical term structure of interest
rates in the absence of the BoJ monetary policies, which I will henceforth label the Real
Yield Curve. By comparing a real yield curve to the nominal yield curve, Baba et al were
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able to derive two very useful conclusions. First, they could compare the current shortterm yield against the anticipated short-term yield at future intervals to determine an
anticipated rate of price inflation/deflation. Secondly, by simply subtracting the
anticipated short-term yield at the various future intervals from the nominal yield on
government bonds of corresponding maturities, they were able to observe the risk
premium the market had built into the various maturities.
To estimate the current short-term interest rate, they simply used the BoJ’s
commitment to zero interest rates or zero. To estimate the anticipated short-term rates,
they used a “macro-finance expectations model” to estimate the short-term interest rate
anticipated by the market in 3 years, 5 years, and 10 years. Specifically, they used a
weighted average of historical short-term interest rates as their dataset and then ran
Monte Carlo simulations to determine the most likely estimate for future rates. (Baba,
Nishioka, Oda, Shirakawa, Ueda, & Ugai, February 2005, p. 73) The difference between
the anticipated short-term rate estimate in the future and the actual current short-term rate
(zero owing to the BoJ’s ZIRP) they reasonably deemed to be a good proxy for the real
rate of price inflation/deflation and therefore the anticipated Japanese CPI, which after all
would ultimately be the target set by the BoJ for assessing the effectiveness of its
monetary policy activities and when such monetary stimulus would conclude. The
difference between the anticipated short-term rate estimate and the actual current shortterm rate (zero) they labeled the “Threshold Rate.” The intervals they used for assessing
the anticipated future short-term interest rates were at 3 years, 5 years, and 10 years.
Obviously, these intervals were chosen to coincide with readily available market data of
nominal yields for 3-year, 5-year, and 10-year Japanese government bonds and proved
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very useful in quantifying the risk premium built into the respective maturities. The
results of their analysis of three-year maturities in respect to the effect on the threshold
inflation rate are reproduced in the Figure 5.
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Figure 5 (Baba, Nishioka, Oda, Shirakawa, Ueda, & Ugai, February 2005, p. 74)
Based on this analysis, Baba et al did determine that the zero interest rate policy
did bring down the threshold rate over the period 1999/Q1 to 2000/Q1, which implies
that the zero interest rate policy did successfully ease the expectation for higher shortterm rates in the future. In respect to the period 2001/Q1 thru 2003/Q3, Baba et al were
less forthcoming with any conclusions as the Japanese economy had begun a mild
recovery by 2002 which obviously would have caused sharp changes to interest rate
expectations and term structures irrespective of the BoJ’s policies.
To derive the second observation, that being a comparison of the nominal yield
curve against a derived real yield curve, they then subtracted the anticipated short-term
rate at the various maturities from the nominal long-term rate reasoning the difference to
be exclusively risk premium built in by the market. Their reasoning was that shocks to
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aggregate demand and supply; or more accurately, the fear or possibility of shocks,
account primarily for the difference between long-term rates and short-term rates. For
purposes herein, I will use their risk premium derivative as a reasonable proxy and
estimate of the demand for liquidity. The results of these calculations are reproduced in
Appendix B.
It seems fairly apparent, particularly in 3-year maturities, but also in 5-year
maturities, that risk premium during the quantitative easing period was virtually
eliminated. However, and also acknowledged by Baba et al, the recovering Japanese
economy beginning in 2002 likely contributed much more to this observation than the
quantitative easing policies of the BoJ. During an economic expansion, inflationary
pressures will build naturally. In anticipation of likely rising inflation and typically at the
first indications of recovery, markets will begin to bid up the longer end of the yield
curve by selling longer term maturities knowing that if inflation heats up, those same
maturities can be replaced with new issues at higher rates, thereby pushing yields up. In
this instance, that natural tendency makes an independent assessment of quantitative
easing virtually impossible.
Therefore, I would conclude that the zero interest rate policy did successfully
arrest the liquidity trap in Japan and contribute to creating an environment of price
stability. This is significant as confidence by investors in a relatively static state in
respect to interest rates and prices are very important prerequisites for new capital
formation and investment. Whether or not quantitative easing, or merely the
announcement of the same, helped the BoJ lend even more credibility to its zero interest
rate commitment is inconclusive simply because the Japanese economy began to recover
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from recession at about the time the quantitative easing campaign might have generated
more conclusive empirical results.
In addressing the second observation of Japan’s efforts, that is whether
quantitative easing can effectively stimulate a resumption of economic activity; Baba et
al again were inconclusive. To their credit, they did label their study as a preliminary
analysis. (Baba, Nishioka, Oda, Shirakawa, Ueda, & Ugai, February 2005, p. 48)
However, they did conjecture that “the effects of a favorable shift in the yield curve on
prices and output have been limited because the reduced net worth of both lenders and
borrowers offset the effect of low interest rates, and therefore an increase in lending and
fixed investment was not realized.” (Baba, Nishioka, Oda, Shirakawa, Ueda, & Ugai,
February 2005, p. 95) In other words, although the investment environment was made
conducive to lending and investment, aggregate demand was so anemic that new
investment decisions and capital purchases simply could not be justified. Thus, the
stimulus that the BoJ created apparently just sat idle in excess bank reserves. While very
large excess banking reserves certainly helped Japanese banks to shore up their capital
ratios and ultimately escape widespread insolvency, it is not apparent that the mere
availability of excess reserves accelerated or even sparked a recovery.
In respect to the second question posed of quantitative easing, that being whether
or not quantitative easing will inevitably ignite an unacceptably high inflationary
environment after the crisis is past, it seems the BoJ was cognizant of this concern. The
fact that the BoJ used the Japanese CPI as its barometer to determine when to cease its
quantitative easing policy certainly supports that conclusion. Here again, because the
Japanese economy began to recover before a full assessment of quantitative easing can be
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made, it seems that the most that can be concluded in this respect is that quantitative
easing will not necessarily or inevitably spark unacceptably high inflation. That is, in the
Japanese case, quantitative easing did not spark unacceptably high inflation as even
through the early stages of the economic recovery inflation rates never rose above zero
and aggressive monetary contractions were never necessary. (Bank of Japan, 2000-2005)
All that can really be concluded on this front is that inflation rates remained within a low
to acceptable range, but that the full magnitude of quantitative easing was likely never
released and therefore the full impact was never realized either.
Empirical Effects of Quantitative Easing: US Credit Crisis 2007-2009
The aggressive and coordinated efforts of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of
England, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan in response to the 2007-2009
international credit crisis provides a second example of central bank coordinated
quantitative easing. It will likely be premature to draw any concrete empirical
conclusions as to the ultimate effectiveness of the efforts or what possible consequences
might be. Although as an observer at the time of this writing, it should be possible to
draw some intermediate empirical conclusions. In addition, in drawing from the Japanese
experience discussed above as well as some current observations, I will attempt a
conjecture as to the likely outcome of these efforts in respect to the two primary
questions of quantitative easing presented in this thesis. Those being, first, can
quantitative easing be expected to restore price stability in a rapidly deteriorating
deflationary setting and, if so, could it also be expected to go the next step and restore
aggregate demand and growth? Second, will the massive liquidity created inevitably
spark a period of unacceptably high price inflation?
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For reference, a brief chronology of the quantitative easing efforts that have been
engaged to date will be discussed. As described in Chapter 2, the Federal Reserve and
the US Treasury had broadcast to the markets and the legislature the need as well as their
intent to aggressively expand the monetary base, both vertically and horizontally, as it
became fairly apparent that the liquidity crisis would vastly exceed the capability of and
really even the design of conventional monetary policy tools. Specifically, the Federal
Reserve was lobbying for expanding its open market operations and zero interest rate
policies into the realm of quantitative easing. (FOMC, 2008)
Consistent with Cecchetti’s and Disyatat’s description, as well as the two phase
convention described previously, the quantitative easing efforts surrounding the
international credit crisis of 2007-2009 will be broken down into two phases. (Cecchetti
& Disyatat, February 19-20, 2009) During the first phase, the Federal Reserve engaged
in the vertically oriented strategy I have described as “central bank balance sheet
restructuring” and encompassed the time period from when subprime mortgage problems
began to surface and credit facilities began to freeze up in July 2007 through September
2008. This first phase began with the failure of two subprime mortgage related hedge
funds underwritten and managed by Bear Stearns and Company, Inc., the Bear Stearns
High-Grade Structured Credit Fund and the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit
Enhanced Leveraged Fund.
During the first phase, several central banks coordinated their efforts to reposition
their existing balance sheets from traditional secure and liquid assets, primarily sovereign
debt and excess bank reserves, into more aggressive and less liquid assets in order to
provide specific and targeted assistance to troubled institutions. The Bank of England
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extended loans, at least initially, to Northern Rock, PLC to allow that institution to meet
its liquidity requirements. The Federal Reserve did the same in assisting Bear Stearns &
Co., Inc., AIG, Inc., and Citigroup, Inc. Essentially, these loans constituted a
repositioning of the central bank’s balance sheet from exclusively sovereign debt into
loans and guarantees to the various institutions while holding central bank balance sheets
more or less constant. (Cecchetti & Disyatat, February 19-20, 2009)
It was during this period that the discussion of moral hazard and too-big-to-fail
really began to shape central bank policy. However, because the various central banks
and regulatory authorities were simply caught off guard, as is the nature of any external
shock, they really did not have adequate time or adequate institutions in place to discuss
the merits of moral hazard and whether firms should be rescued, wound down, or allowed
to fail. Very simply, over the prior twenty year period predisposed to deregulation,
numerous firms had grown into systemically important firms with likely catastrophic
consequences in the event of their failure. By repositioning their balance sheets to extend
life-line loans to these various institutions, the central banks attempted to quietly assist
these distressed firms and buy some time until alternatives could be explored and
regulatory authorities could hopefully intervene. Obviously, the hope was that the new
liquidity would prevent the firms from failing, which would create even greater liquidity
demands on the central banks and distress in the markets.
One of the perceived advantages of central bank balance sheet repositioning
mentioned above, that being the central bank’s ability to quietly and discreetly target
specific assets of specific institutions in order to avoid predatory-like speculation and
depositor panic. In hindsight, that effort obviously failed. For instance, the deal made by
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the Federal Reserve to assist, some would argue entice, JP Morgan Chase & Co. to
acquire Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. in March, 2008 was hardly discreet as the terms of the
deal were published in numerous publications, including the New York Times, as the
deal unfolded. (Sorkin, 2008)
Not to be critical of the Federal Reserve, as the problems at Bear Stearns & Co.,
Inc. were well publicized as, in response to the firm’s hedge fund failures, Bear Stearns &
Co., Inc. had committed $3.2 billion of the firm’s own capital only a few months prior to
liquidate the two failed hedge funds previously identified. (Creswell & Bajas, 2007)
However, the fact that the Federal Reserve did not or could not act more candidly did
contribute, I would argue, to a speculative bear raid on virtually every financial firm in
the ensuing months. Publishing the terms of the JP Morgan Chase & Co. acquisition of
Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. effectively advertised the template favored by the Federal
Reserve for bank rescues. Obviously, if speculators are reasonably assured that the
Federal Reserve is prepared ultimately to come to the rescue of the banking system, they
will be emboldened to act more aggressively than what they might otherwise.
There is some compelling evidence that speculators did contribute heavily to the
collapse of the banking system by piling on short sales of bank shares, perhaps illegally
in some instances, to drive prices down. (US Securities Exchange Commission, March
18, 2009, pp. 15-16) As discussed in Chapter 1, heavy short selling caused bank share
prices to plummet. As share prices fell so too did bank equity, which naturally created
the inevitable capital shortages and the associated death spiral of financial firms.
Although the banking institutions largely ignored moral hazard in the buildup of the
credit bubble, I would also submit that speculators were equally guilty of the same in the
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bust cycle by knowing that the Federal Reserve would ultimately come to the rescue and
prevent the whole system from collapse.
The second phase of quantitative easing efforts encompasses the time period of
September 2008 though the current period which began with the mass failures of
numerous financial institutions, most notably the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc. It was the failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. that really signaled
to the monetary authorities that the Federal Reserve would need to drastically expand its
balance sheet, in addition to all of the other strategies already in play, if the liquidity
crisis were going to be contained. Thus, consistent with my definition earlier, the Federal
Reserve engaged in the horizontally oriented strategy of “central bank balance sheet
expansion.”
What materialized was a veritable alphabet soup of programs designed to inject
liquidity aggressively into the monetary system. The following is a brief description of
some such programs that ensued:
Primary Credit Dealer Facility (PDCF).
The PDCF was originally initiated in March, 2008 in order to allow expanded
access to the Federal Reserve liquidity facilities by primary dealers (the “Fed discount
window”). Consistent with central bank balance sheet repositioning, the PDCF was
expanded to allow all eligible repo assets as collateral, which includes US Treasury
securities, US agency obligations, and certain Mortgage Backed Securities. (Federal
Reserve Bank, 2009) In addition, it was through this facility that previously ineligible
financial institutions (such as GE Capital, Ford Motor Credit, Goldman Sachs, and many
more) were permitted to re-charter themselves into bank holding companies in order to
65

access directly the Federal Reserve discount window. Although it was accessed
somewhat sparingly prior to September, use of the PDCF ballooned in the weeks
following the Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. failure. By September 29, borrowing
against the PDCF spiked to $155.8 billion. (Federal Reserve Bank , 2008, pp. 20-21)
Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF).
The TSLF program essentially allowed primary dealers to exchange certain more
risky collateral for US Treasury securities with no haircut or penalty, except a 0.0010%
fee. By September 14, 2008 the TSLF had been expanded to allow as collateral: US
Treasury securities, US Agency debt, highly rated residential and commercial mortgages,
US Agency collateralized mortgages, highly rated asset-backed securities (ABS), and
finally investment grade corporate debt. By December 31, 2008, the program had
expanded to $165 billion. (Federal Reserve Bank , 2008, pp. 21-22)
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Lending Facility
(AMLF) and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).
The AMLF and the CPFF, introduced in September and October, 2008, were
designed to provide liquidity relief to money market mutual funds. As referenced earlier,
numerous money market facilities and mutual funds had “broken the buck” in response to
redemption requests that exceeded the various funds available cash. In response, these
funds were forced to liquidate holdings prior to maturity. These programs effectively
allowed these institutions to exchange assets, primarily commercial paper and certificates
of deposit of a short duration anyway, for liquidity to meet their redemption requests.
The AMLF initially extended $152 billion in loans. The CPFF had extended $334 billion
by December 31, 2008. (Federal Reserve Bank , 2008, pp. 23-24)
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Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF).
In order to facilitate the flow of credit to households and small businesses, TALF
was introduced in November, 2008 to encourage lenders to issue high quality asset
backed securities (ABS) with a variety of otherwise inadequate assets as collateral, such
as; student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and SBA loans (Small Business
Administration). The Federal Reserve set aside up to $200 billion to help span the gap
between the AAA-rated ABS issued and the less than AAA-rated collateral pledged.
(Federal Reserve Bank , 2008, p. 24)
Term Auction Facility (TAF).
The TAF was designed to allow primary dealers to bid for loans of funds from the
Federal Reserve in a regularly scheduled auction to meet liquidity requirements with the
interest rate determined by the auction. As collateral, the Federal Reserve accepted a
wide range of assets consistent with those detailed above under the Term Securities
Lending Facility. $900 billion was made available under the TAF and by December 31,
$450 billion of credit had been issued. (Federal Reserve Bank , 2008, p. 24)
Reciprocal Currency Arrangements with other Central Banks (currency swap
arrangements).
In order to facilitate dollar demand around the world during the credit crisis, the
Federal Reserve expanded its direct swap arrangements with other central banks from
two (European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank) to thirteen (Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Denmark, England, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore,
and Sweden). This accommodation resulted in the creation of $550 billion in new
currency swapped for other currencies. (Federal Reserve Bank , 2008, p. 25)
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The net impact to the monetary base of these actions can be seen below in figures
6 and 7. The phase 1 central bank balance sheet repositioning program had a nominal
impact to the overall balance sheet of the Federal Reserve in that it only expanded $29
billion (3.2%) between December 31, 2007 and September 10, 2008. (Federal Reserve
Bank , 2008, p. 28) However, the construct of the balance sheet changed dramatically as
demonstrated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6 (Federal Reserve Bank , 2008, p. 28)
The net impact of the phase 2 central bank balance sheet expansion program, as
one would expect, was tremendous. In three months, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet
expanded by $1,340 billion (145%) to $2.263 trillion and also continued the dramatic
shift into more unconventional and more risky assets, as illustrated in Figure 7.
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The well publicized and equally controversial Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP) is not included in this paper as it was a fiscal tool created under the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Although some of the TARP was used to fund
some of the above referenced monetary programs, specifically $20 billion to the TALF
program, the vast majority of liquidity provided under TARP was used by the US
Treasury to shore up bank capital. (Congressional Budget Office, January 2009)
As was the case with analyzing empirically the Japanese quantitative easing effort
described above, the degree to which this massive liquidity expansion has been effective
will be analyzed. In order to make an assessment of the phase I (central bank balance
sheet reposition) and phase II (central bank balance sheet expansion) monetary efforts of
the Federal Reserve, I will attempt similar assessments to those made by Baba et al.
(Baba, Nishioka, Oda, Shirakawa, Ueda, & Ugai, February 2005) For review, these
assessments will be aimed at making a determination as to whether or not the Federal
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Reserve’s efforts successfully assisted in bringing about an improved level of price
stability in an otherwise rapidly deteriorating deflationary spiral. Second, these
assessments will attempt to establish whether or not the phase I and phase II monetary
efforts at least assisted in establishing an environment of improving output and aggregate
demand. Finally, the degree to which quantitative easing might be expected to ignite a
period of unacceptably high inflation will be examined.
I will use a similar method to that employed by Baba et al in their analysis, but
will rely on a different measure of price stability and sentiment. In order to ascertain the
anticipated rate of inflation at future intervals (that is expected prices) a much simpler
and hopefully more accurate mechanism is available in evaluating the US price
environment than what was available to Baba et al.
In 1997, the US Treasury introduced a special class of treasury securities designed
to give bond investors absolute protection against future inflation rates. These securities,
known as Treasury Inflation Protections Securities (or TIPS), have another obvious and
particularly useful application. From the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, “TIPS also
promise economists and policymakers a potential way to tease out the market’s
expectations for the future course of inflation. In principle, subtracting the real yield on
TIPS from the nominal yield of Treasury notes of the same maturity should give a
market-based measure of expected inflation (at the various maturities).” (Carlstrom &
Fuerst, January, 2005)
As Carstrom & Fuerst discuss, there are a couple of problems in assessing future
inflation rates from TIPS yields that need to be considered before accepting this method
purely on faith as a reasonable measure of anticipated inflation rates. First of all, owing
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to the nature of inflation risk and perhaps investors’ natural tendency to want to hedge
against such a prospect, it is expected that the TIPS method would overstate actual or
realized inflation rates. In my experience, investors with a concern for future inflation
tend to be rather exuberant in their fear and would therefore likely sway TIPS yields
accordingly. One could argue that an efficiently operating market would attract contra
trades from those without such a concern for future inflation and neutralize the market to
reflect an accurate yield. However, in reality, those contra trades are typically directed to
the traditional treasury market because of its much higher liquidity characteristics thereby
exaggerating the spread between TIPS yields and traditional bonds yields.
Secondly, certainly in respect to the market for traditional treasury securities, the
TIPS market is infinitely smaller and therefore much more illiquid. One characteristic of
an illiquid market for debt securities in general is investors’ tendency to simply hold their
security to maturity rather than accept a discount for illiquidity if they sold their bond
prior to maturity. For example, if inflation concerns were to ease, many holders of TIPS
would simply hold their TIPS investments anyway rather than realize an illiquidity
discount upon selling the TIPS. The natural effect of this tendency would be to
understate the actual anticipated inflation rate simply because the TIPS price would be
artificially higher than it would be in a more liquid market.
Carlstrom & Fuerst did argue that these two problematic characteristics of TIPS
were in fact countervailing and would therefore act to some degree to cancel each other
out. (Carlstrom & Fuerst, January, 2005) In light of these pitfalls of TIPS yields, it is
important to be careful about using TIPS yields to make assessments regarding future
inflation rates.
71

I believe these pitfalls are largely irrelevant for the purposes herein as I am simply
attempting to observe changing market sentiment in regards to liquidity demand over a
relatively short period. Any error between actual inflation rates and those predicted by
TIPS yields would most likely be constant (or static in magnitude) and therefore
irrelevant when measuring market sentiment. I am simply attempting to measure the
direction of investor sentiment towards future inflation rates and pricing in order to assess
whether or not the stimulus from quantitative easing is effective or not. Whether or not
this TIPS method can accurately predict actual inflation rates is not important for the
purposes of this assessment.
Employing this “TIPS method” allows a simple assessment of prices and price
stability. Under this method, the real interest rate (r) is simply set at the TIPS yield. This
assumption allows the following basic equation:
Where π = anticipated inflation rate (prices), i = (nominal) treasury
yield, r = (real) TIPS yield.
In order to make this assessment as realistic as possible, I have chosen to analyze
5 year maturities in so far as that is the earliest maturity of TIPS that the US Treasury
issues. Illustrated below in figure 8 are representations of price stability during the credit
crisis based on this TIPS method. The data used is reproduced in Appendix C.
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Figure 8 (Federal Reserve, 2005-2009)
For reference and effect, I have elected as well to illustrate the best available
representation of the extreme demand or preference for liquidity during this period by
also plotting the yield on the 4 week US T-bill, which is certainly considered the most
short term and liquid security available. The extreme demand for only the most liquid
securities can be seen convincingly as the yield on the 4 week US T-bill fell from 5.07%
in July, 2007, which marks the commencement of the Phase I quantitative easing, to
basically zero by the climax of the crisis in mid September, 2008. In fact, as the chart
illustrates as well, the demand for liquidity had been rising for some time prior with the 4
week T-bill yield declining for several months, albeit in fits and starts, even prior to the
Phase I efforts. This additional liquidity demand would certainly, at least in part, have
been attributable to the conventional monetary policy measures in effect at the time.
Though not illustrated in figure 8, the fed funds rate was cut from 5.25% in July, 2007 to
3.18% by the time the Phase I quantitative easing began in January, 2008.
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The net effect in respect to price stability can be seen in a relatively stable
Anticipated Inflation Rate (π) through July, 2008. Referencing my statement from
Chapter 1 that “the Federal Reserve’s conventional monetary easing worked in textbook
fashion” is further supported in this respect in figure 8, at least through July, 2008.
However, as the events of the credit crisis of 2008 began to unfold and financial
institutions began to fail in March 2008, as described in detail earlier, the demand for
liquidity as represented by the 4 week US T-bill yield began to accelerate beyond levels
that the Federal Reserve could accommodate or absorb. It was in September, 2008 when
the wholesale failure of the financial institutions described earlier so frightened and
shocked the markets that the demand for liquidity climaxed. In order to satisfy the
excessive liquidity demand, net “selling of illiquid assets ensued in order to satisfy
exceedingly high liquidity demand, which necessarily generated price discounts.”
Utilizing the TIPS method for estimating price stability, rather instability,
generated a -1.40% rate of inflation (that is price deflation) by November, 2008 (figure
8). It seems reasonable to conclude that the demand for liquidity at any price had
trumped any reasonable valuation metric for the underlying assets. Thus is the essence of
“panic selling.” Furthermore, I would argue that without the Phase II quantitative easing
campaign that commenced at the absolute peak of liquidity demand and trough of price
deflation as seen in figure 8, prices most certainly would have continued to deteriorate
until the market cleared itself naturally. In the vacuous pricing environment at the time, I
fear that realization quite literally meant that everyone who wanted or needed liquidity
was liquidated, which in this context is synonymous with bankrupted.
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As the Federal Reserve poured liquidity into the system by means of its phase II
monetary efforts, it can be seen in figure 8 the nearly immediate relief to pricing
expectations, and therefore price stability as measured by π. Simultaneously, the Federal
Reserve held nominal short term fed funds rates at near zero while the pricing/inflation
environment improved. Thus, according to the equation for determining real interest
rates (r = i - π), the demand for liquidity also dropped dramatically over the same period.
As further evidence supporting the success of the phase II quantitative easing campaign,
the deflationary pricing spiral immediately reversed course and by December, 2009 had
more or less resumed an anticipated inflation rate of 1.91%, which is certainly more in
line with the long term trend in the US, generally considered to be 2-3% CPI growth.
Therefore, in respect to the first assessment of quantitative easing, and based on
this evaluation of price stability and the general demand for liquidity, it seems fairly
apparent that quantitative easing did successfully arrest the most destructive period of
pricing instability since the Great Depression. The effort did successfully restore
confidence to the market place with a very large and very credible “buyer of last resort”
that effectively placed a bid in the market where no other sufficient bid was forthcoming.
The degree to which these aggressive liquidity measures of the Federal Reserve
can be credited with sparking a recovery is somewhat more elusive. As was the case with
the Japanese analysis, at the time of this writing, the US economic recovery is still
somewhat tenuous even 20 months after the phase II quantitative easing was initiated.
Certainly, most economic measures are now improving with the exception of
employment. However, consistent with the conclusions drawn of the Japanese analysis
as well as the well known “pushing on a string” dilemma, I suspect that the US
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quantitative easing campaign will mostly be credited with shoring up the banking system,
and nothing more. That suspicion is certainly supported by statistics from the Federal
Reserve that show bank reserves ballooning during the period that quantitative easing
was employed (figure 3 reproduced).
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Figure 9 (Figure 3 reproduced)
Obviously, a healthy banking sector is a prerequisite to any capital-centric
economy in order to direct capital from savers to borrowers and from investors to
innovators. More specifically, banks need to be adequately capitalized in order to foster
lending and the general flow of credit. So to the extent that phase I and phase II
quantitative easing accelerated a recovery in the balance sheets of the US banking and
financial industry, I would argue that it should be credited with at least partially
accelerating the recovery of a much more solvent and liquid banking and financial sector.
It should therefore be presumed that an eventual resumption of aggregate demand and
lower unemployment built on the back of a healthy flow of credit and investment
underwritten by these same financial intermediaries would most certainly take place
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much sooner than it would have otherwise, that is in the absence of quantitative easing
where the whole system had been allowed to clear naturally in a laissez-faire free market
purge.
To be sure, numerous other factors would need to be considered and credited
when doling out credit for an eventual recovery of the broad economy, not the least of
which would be the massive fiscal stimulus package of the Obama administration.
However, in deference to the aforementioned “pushing on a string” dilemma that is
apparently a characteristic of monetary easing in general, both conventional and
unconventional, until a genuine appetite for risk resumes and individuals, institutions, and
businesses collectively can justify investment projects, as was the case with the Japanese
analysis, the mountains of excess reserves created will simply sit by idly in bank vaults.
In the case of the US, banks have been criticized almost daily by both the Obama
Administration and the financial press in their perceived unwillingness to lend. The
reality, I would argue, is that these banks and financial institutions are in the business of
making sound loans and investment decisions.
Obviously, that statement will raise some eyebrows in light of the reckless
behavior of banks lending practices the past few years, but generally speaking and for
several hundred years, banks and financial institutions have been prudent stewards in this
respect. As several banks have argued, the investment climate is simply not conducive to
lending right now, especially relative to the massive amounts of liquidity that have been
created and are now sitting on reserve. (Department of the Treasury, 2009, p. 10) There
is quite simply too much excess capacity, both labor and capital, to warrant new
investment.
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Therefore, in respect to the ability of quantitative easing to actually spark an
economic recovery, I would conclude that it is a warranted practice under extreme
conditions that can restore the credit environment and make lending and the extension of
credit more conducive. Ultimately, however, a real recovery will depend on the
restoration of the flow of real transactions such as; consumption, investment, inventories,
and employment. Unfortunately, these things just take time. Excess inventories have to
be taken down or depleted before they can be rebuilt and excess manufacturing capacity
has to be reemployed or depreciated before anyone will consider any new investments or
rehiring.
My final analysis of quantitative easing will center on the much publicized
concern that the mountains of liquidity created will inevitably create a hyperinflationary
environment. I will assume a minor liberty in this respect as a popular criticism and
concern voiced regularly in the media is in respect to the inevitable inflationary impact of
quantitative easing. Insofar as engineering an inflationary price environment is actually
the stated goal in combating and reversing the deflationary environment, I am going to
assume that an unacceptably high level of inflation is really more the concern.
The first step in this analysis is to recognize that a deflationary environment
where aggressive quantitative easing is in effect will by definition generate a rising real
interest rate. In reviewing the calculation for the real interest rate:
where, r = real interest rate, i = (nominal) treasury yield, and π =
anticipated inflation rate (prices)
The problem arises in that a deflationary environment where π is negative, the
above equation will require subtracting a negative number from the nominal interest rate,
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which is assumed to be at or near zero to begin with. Therefore, the equation will
generate a positive real interest rate in a deflationary environment, which is not
particularly useful or accurate in trying to assess the actual pricing environment or the
impact of quantitative easing.
Therefore, it is necessary to revise the equation in a deflationary environment to
measure instead the optimal interest rate as described earlier as a largely theoretical
interest rate similar in character to the Wicksellian natural interest rate. It is an interest
rate that, if attained, would clear the supply of money with the demand for investment
capital from investors. As the 2007-2009 deflationary spiral pointed out, where π was
negative, the above equation would need to be modified to prevent subtracting a negative
number in order to generate the optimal interest rate. Thus, I have modified the equation
as follows to correct that problem:
′
| | where, r’ = optimal interest rate, i = (nominal) treasury yield, and π =
anticipated inflation rate (prices)
This revised equation will generate an interest rate, defined here as the optimal
interest rate, which would effectively clear the market. In a deflationary environment, the
optimal interest rate is obviously negative as was experienced during the 2007-2009
credit crisis. An interest rate environment where the prevailing optimal interest rate is
negative obviously implies that subsidies are necessary in order to attract investment
capital. In this case, the subsidies were provided through quantitative easing and a
commitment to a zero rate conventional monetary policy.
The purpose in placing so much emphasis on the optimal interest rate is that it
may very well help to equate r’ in a deflationary environment to what Keynes described
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as the schedule of the Marginal Efficiency of Capital, defined by Keynes as “the
aggregate generalization of the schedule for the expectation of yield and of the current
supply price of an asset.” (Keynes, 1964, pp. 135-137) Simply stated, anticipated
investment returns (the expectation of yield) simply have to justify the optimal interest
rate expense, as well as some other risks, costs, and hassles (the current supply price of
the asset), before any demand for capital can be expected to resume. In an extremely
distressed pricing environment, such as was experienced during the 2007-2009 credit
crisis, instances where |π| generated the expectation of negative investment yields or a
negative optimal interest rate occurred regularly. That is, anticipated investment returns
were negative and therefore no investment demand was forthcoming, which is another
way of describing the pushing on a string dilemma discussed above.
Krugman discussed this elementary prerequisite for investment demand as well in
a more contemporary context. (Krugman, 2010)

He pointed out that as long as

anticipated investment returns are negative, which he defined as the real/optimal interest
rate less GDP, there really is no danger of excessive price inflation simply because no
investment capital will be forthcoming. Essentially, Krugman argues that there is no
economic reason why the central bank could not assume an even more aggressive posture
in its quantitative easing strategy and continuously flood the market with liquidity until it
runs up against debt service limitations. So long as longer term interest rates remain low,
the central bank could take advantage of that environment and subsequently service that
debt out of a correspondingly low percentage of GDP. The only real limitation to such a
maneuver would be the political uproar.
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Therefore, in respect to the issue at hand of whether or not quantitative easing will
inevitably create an unacceptably high level of inflation, given the revised equation for
deriving the optimal interest rate, I would argue it is not a very likely scenario for the
following reason. Once a recovery takes hold and a positive optimal interest rate returns,
which is after all a market determined measure of the demand for investment capital (or a
Marginal Efficiency of Capital that is conducive to investment), the market has the built
in capacity to successfully determine a corresponding nominal interest rate that will
prevent an excessive inflation situation from developing. Here again, as there is no
reciprocal to the lower bound of nominal interest rates, the nominal interest rate will be
free to rise as much as necessary in order to stem a potentially high inflation rate. Thus,
the question at hand becomes one more concerned with what the upper bound for interest
rates that might be necessary to contain any anticipated inflation and whether or not such
a rate acceptable.
For two reasons, the Federal Reserve should be able to contain nominal interest
rates within what was defined earlier (figure 4) as a normal range through primarily
conventional monetary policy. First of all, and at the same time, as the market derived
optimal interest rate rises naturally, so too should the synthetic fed funds rate. Reflecting
conventional monetary policy, much of the liquidity created during the crisis will simply
be bought back and retired by the Federal Reserve thereby contracting naturally its
balance sheet. It is difficult to speculate how much of an impact on the Fed’s balance
sheet that normal “rate hikes” might have, but I would certainly expect it to be
substantial.
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Secondly, and potentially even more powerful, the Federal Reserve will be in a
position to start selling much of the assets that were purchased in the fire sale. Not only
should demand for these same assets have returned by virtue of the higher interest
rate/higher Marginal Efficiency of Capital environment, but in selling these assets, the
Federal Reserve will be accepting as payment the very liquidity they created, which they
would simply retire. As the demand for liquidity subsides and the demand for risk
returns, the Federal Reserve will once again be in a position to satisfy the market with
asset sales. I recognize that such activity does fall outside of what would be considered
conventional monetary tightening; however, it does represent a return or a move back
towards conventional methods.
Therefore, I would submit that the only real risk for excessive inflation is whether
or not the Federal Reserve will allow policy to set the optimal interest rate that clears
investment demand with investment supply at some sustainable level and summarily take
its own monetary clues from these reliable sources. As discussed in Chapter 1, they
failed rather remarkably in this regard throughout 2002 – 2004. Consequently, it cannot
really be determined with any degree of confidence how the Federal Reserve will behave
in this respect. Unfortunately, this is where the story and the analysis begin to become
more political in nature. Certainly, the Federal Reserve has the power of independence
from political forces to allow natural market forces to reabsorb the excess liquidity. The
extent to which they will heed these market based clues, however, is another question I
cannot begin address.
Therefore, in respect to the likelihood that quantitative easing will necessarily
generate excessive inflation once the business cycle starts up again, I would conclude that
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for two reasons, it is not very likely. First, the market for interest rates is naturally very
well equipped to absorb the excess liquidity through higher interest rates once the
investment climate improves. The Federal Reserve will, or at least should, be ready to
aggressively begin absorbing and retiring liquidity as well through conventional
monetary rate hikes and, for lack of a better term, unconventional quantitative tightening.
Secondly, insofar as there is no reciprocal to the lower bound for nominal interest
rates in an inflationary environment, the nominal interest rate will be free to rise to
whatever level is necessary to stem inflation. Because there is generally a realistic level
that one can expect from investment returns, that is under normal and unsubsidized
conditions, price inflation and nominal interest rates should be bound within normal and
long term average ranges.
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Chapter Four: Conclusions
Under ordinary circumstances and for decades, conventional monetary policy
measures have proven to be very effective tools at a central banks disposal for stimulating
or moderating economic activity. However, under extraordinary circumstances such as
those exhibited in the recent global credit crisis these conventional tools will have limited
effect. Where a credit crisis is characterized by extraordinary liquidity demand that
exceeds even what can be generated by a zero interest rate policy, the apparent optimal
interest rate must certainly be negative. Therefore, conventional monetary policy tools
will fall short simply because the central bank cannot cut nominal interest rates below
zero.
After all conventional tools are exhausted without fully satisfying liquidity
demand; a central bank may move to engage in more aggressive and controversial
monetary tactics which have been referred to herein as unconventional monetary tools.
Within this paper, the primary unconventional tool under examination has been
quantitative easing. Two such instances have been attempted in recent history to a
complete enough degree to draw some analysis and conclusions. The Bank of Japan used
quantitative easing coordinated with a stated zero interest rate policy to combat a
persistent and grating deflationary environment from 2001-2005 with mixed results.
Again, but in reaction to a much more climatic and distressed environment, the Federal
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Reserve engaged its own brand of quantitative easing during the global economic crisis
of 2007-2009, again with mixed results.
It was consistent in both the Japanese case as well as the United States case that
quantitative easing did successfully arrest the deflationary spiral, thereby preventing a
complete collapse of prices and the accompanying spread to the financial sector and the
economy in general. This was accomplished first by expanding the types of assets that
central banks would either accept as collateral or by purchasing outright from member
banks progressively more risky asset categories. Second, as liquidity demand required,
the central bank expanded its balance sheet, in the case of the United States very
aggressively, to accept as collateral or to purchase outright huge sums of illiquid bank
assets.
However, just as the “pushing on a string” dilemma renders conventional
monetary policy rather ineffective in actually generating economic growth, so too it
appears equally difficult to spark a recovery from quantitative easing alone. The
conditions necessary for economic recovery will necessarily require, as Keynes
described, a Marginal Efficiency of Capital that is conducive to investment. The
availability of capital and a renewed and recapitalized banking sector is certainly a
prerequisite to recovery, but until an outright demand for investment capital returns, the
massive reserves available in the banking sector will undoubtedly sit idle. Until
investments in general can reasonably be expected to return a positive absolute yield,
there will simply be very little demand for investment capital.
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Finally, it does not seem too likely that quantitative easing will spark
unacceptably high inflation. Although the Japanese case ended before a complete
assessment of the potential for high inflation could be made, it certainly should be noted
that inflation was never a problem in the aftermath of Japanese quantitative easing and
therefore will not necessarily create unreasonably high inflation. In review of the US
quantitative easing case, it should be understood that no reciprocal to the lower bound of
nominal interest rates exists. Therefore, in such a highly developed and liquid market for
interest rates, conventional monetary policy should prove perfectly capable of
withdrawing the necessary stimulus through conventional means long before inflation can
accelerate to an unacceptable level.
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Appendix A
Select US Banking Statistics
Banking

Rate of

Total

Average Total

Average Assets

Institutions

Consolidation

Assets x 1mm

Assets x 1mm

Growth Rate

1980

14434

$

1,854

$

0.13

1981

14414

-0.14%

$

2,026

$

0.14

9.43%

1982

14451

0.26%

$

2,193

$

0.15

7.97%

1983

14469

0.12%

$

2,342

$

0.16

6.66%

1984

14496

0.19%

$

2,508

$

0.17

6.89%

1985

14417

-0.54%

$

2,730

$

0.19

9.45%

1986

14210

-1.44%

$

2,940

$

0.21

9.26%

1987

13723

-3.43%

$

2,999

$

0.22

5.63%

1988

13137

-4.27%

$

3,130

$

0.24

9.02%

1989

12715

-3.21%

$

3,299

$

0.26

8.90%

1990

12347

-2.89%

$

3,389

$

0.27

5.79%

1991

11927

-3.40%

$

3,430

$

0.29

4.77%

1992

11467

-3.86%

$

3,506

$

0.31

6.32%

1993

10961

-4.41%

$

3,707

$

0.34

10.61%

1994

10453

-4.63%

$

4,012

$

0.38

13.49%*

1995

9943

-4.88%

$

4,315

$

0.43

13.07%

1996

9530

-4.15%

$

4,582

$

0.48

10.79%

1997

9144

-4.05%

$

5,018

$

0.55

14.14%

1998

8777

-4.01%

$

5,442

$

0.62

12.98%

1999

8582

-2.22%

$

5,735

$

0.67

7.78%

2000

8315

-3.11%

$

6,245

$

0.75

12.39%

2001

8082

-2.80%

$

6,552

$

0.81

7.94%

2002

7888

-2.40%

$

7,076

$

0.90

10.65%

2003

7770

-1.50%

$

7,601

$

0.98

9.05%

2004

7631

-1.79%

$

8,415

$

1.10

12.73%

2005

7526

-1.38%

$

9,040

$

1.20

8.93%

2006

7401

-1.66%

$

10,091

$

1.36

13.51%

2007

7283

-1.59%

$

11,176

$

1.53

12.55%

2008

7086

-2.70%

$

12,310

$

1.74

13.21%

*Riegel-Neal Act
(FDIC)
91

Appendix B

(Baba, Nishioka, Oda, Shirakawa, Ueda, & Ugai, February 2005, p. 75)
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Appendix C
Yield Data in TIPS Method for Calculating Anticipated Inflation

Jan-06
Feb-06
Mar-06
Apr-06
May-06
Jun-06
Jul-06
Aug-06
Sep-06
Oct-06
Nov-06
Dec-06
Jan-07
Feb-07
Mar-07
Apr-07
May-07
Jun-07
Jul-07
Aug-07
Sep-07
Oct-07
Nov-07
Dec-07
Jan-08
Feb-08
Mar-08
Apr-08
May-08
Jun-08
Jul-08
Aug-08
Sep-08
Oct-08
Nov-08
Dec-08
Jan-09
Feb-09

5 Yr T-note 5 Yr TIPS Anticipated Inflation Optimal Interest
Rate = π
Yield = i
Yield = r
Rate = r'
4.35
1.93
2.42
1.93
4.57
1.98
2.59
1.98
4.72
2.09
2.63
2.09
4.90
2.26
2.64
2.26
5.00
2.30
2.70
2.30
5.07
2.45
2.62
2.45
5.04
2.46
2.58
2.46
4.82
2.27
2.55
2.27
4.67
2.38
2.29
2.38
4.69
2.51
2.18
2.51
4.58
2.41
2.17
2.41
4.53
2.28
2.25
2.28
4.75
2.47
2.28
2.47
4.71
2.34
2.37
2.34
4.48
2.04
2.44
2.04
4.59
2.12
2.47
2.12
4.67
2.29
2.38
2.29
5.03
2.65
2.38
2.65
4.88
2.60
2.28
2.60
4.43
2.39
2.04
2.39
4.20
2.14
2.06
2.14
4.20
2.01
2.19
2.01
3.67
1.35
2.32
1.35
3.49
1.27
2.22
1.27
2.98
0.86
2.12
0.86
2.78
0.65
2.13
0.65
2.48
0.23
2.25
0.23
2.84
0.62
2.22
0.62
3.15
0.79
2.36
0.79
3.49
0.97
2.52
0.97
3.30
0.84
2.46
0.84
3.14
1.15
1.99
1.15
2.88
1.55
1.33
1.55
2.73
2.75
-0.02
2.71
2.29
3.69
-1.40
0.89
1.52
1.76
-0.24
1.28
1.60
1.59
0.01
1.59
1.87
1.29
0.58
1.29
93

Mar-09
Apr-09
May-09
Jun-09
Jul-09
Aug-09
Sep-09
Oct-09
Nov-09
Dec-09

1.82
1.86
2.13
2.71
2.46
2.57
2.37
2.33
2.23
2.34

1.23
1.11
1.07
1.18
1.18
1.29
1.03
0.83
0.48
0.43

0.59
0.75
1.06
1.53
1.28
1.28
1.34
1.50
1.75
1.91

(Federal Reserve, 2005-2009)
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1.23
1.11
1.07
1.18
1.18
1.29
1.03
0.83
0.48
0.43

